tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-58074091393481117902024-03-13T05:52:43.921-07:00Muslim Brotherhood watchBenyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.comBlogger9125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-83487905121694458882011-05-01T23:22:00.001-07:002011-05-01T23:22:09.561-07:00My show<object classid="clsid:D27CDB6E-AE6D-11cf-96B8-444553540000" codebase='http://download.adobe.com/pub/shockwave/cabs/flash/swflash.cab#version=9,0,0,0' width='210' height='270' name="131727" id="131727"><param name="movie" value="http://www.blogtalkradio.com/btrplayer.swf?file=http://www.blogtalkradio.com%2Fright-wing-jew-benyamin-solomon%2Fplay_list.xml%3Fitemcount%3D5&autostart=false&bufferlength=5&volume=80&corner=rounded&callback=http://www.blogtalkradio.com/flashplayercallback.aspx" /><param name="quality" value="high" /><param name="wmode" value="transparent" /><param name="menu" value="false" /><param name="allowScriptAccess" value="always" /><embed src="http://www.blogtalkradio.com/btrplayer.swf" flashvars="file=http://www.blogtalkradio.com%2fright-wing-jew-benyamin-solomon%2fplay_list.xml%3Fitemcount%3D5&autostart=false&shuffle=false&callback=http://www.blogtalkradio.com/FlashPlayerCallback.aspx&width=210&height=270&volume=80&corner=rounded" width="210" height="270" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" pluginspage="http://www.macromedia.com/go/getflashplayer" quality="high" wmode="transparent" menu="false" name="131727" id="131727" allowScriptAccess="always"></embed></object><div style="font-size: 10px;text-align: center; width:220px;">Listen to <a href="http://www.blogtalkradio.com">internet radio</a> with <a href="http://www.blogtalkradio.com/right-wing-jew-benyamin-solomon">Benyamin Solomon</a> on Blog Talk Radio</div>Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-58967169867812640272009-02-15T13:24:00.000-08:002009-06-06T09:30:07.220-07:00commentary from the heroic Benyamin SolomonCommentary from the heroic Benyamin Solomon:The Muslim Brotherhood is practically the father of radical Islam, which is a Fascist medieval ideology. MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Monitor is a great source to research the threat of militant Islam. This goes to show that the Muslim Brotherhood is not moderate, contrary to pro-Muslim Brotherhood propagandists like Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke. The Muslim Brotherhood is an anti-democratic Islamo-Nazi group. For Mahmoun Fandy, author of "America and the Arab world after 9/11" said, “The Nazis early on really sort of influenced that totalitarian impulse, the totalitarian streak in the Muslim Brotherhood.” The Muslim Brotherhood collaborated with the Nazis in WWII and got many totalitarian aspects from them. And the leader of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood at the time Haj Amin Al-Husseini, who founded the Palestinian terrorist struggle against Israel, was Hitler's best friend in the Muslim world. He helped bring Nazi anti-Semitism into the Middle East and said on Berlin radio to "Kill the Jews wherever you find them." He led two Bosnian Muslim SS. divisions and was one of the organizers of a pro-Nazi coup in Iraq in 1941. Though that coup fortunately failed, everyone who took part in the coup including Al-Husseini carried out a vicious terrorist pogrom on Iraqi Jews known as the Farhud. It got many Iraqi Jews to flee.<br />That Muslim Brotherhood website posted articles that spewed the basic concept of militant Islam, which is jihad against infidels.Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-19372292109109042502008-07-11T19:16:00.000-07:002008-07-11T19:19:03.127-07:00<object id="BLOG_video-FAILED" class="BLOG_video_class" width="320" height="266" contentid="FAILED"></object>Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-622826161459928602008-07-10T22:11:00.001-07:002008-07-10T22:11:50.282-07:00Showdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Part IIIBy Patrick Poole<br />FrontPageMagazine.com | Friday, April 20, 2007<br />In this concluding Part 3 of my rejoinder to Nixon Center Fellows Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke’s article, “A Response to Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood’,” I cover the following points:<br /><br />1) The very un-moderate statements of the so-called “moderates” they identify within the Muslim Brotherhood;<br />2) I take note that many of the reformists within the Brotherhood, many of whom served in the organization’s leadership, left a long time ago (1996) to form the Al-Wasat (“Center”) Party, frustrated by the radicalization and ideological lockdown within the Brotherhood;<br /> <br />3) I respond to their accusation that US foreign policy is responsible for Islamic radicalization in the Middle East;<br /> <br />4) I document my previous claim that the Brotherhood has engaged in vote rigging and rampant financial fraud in their administration of the professional syndicates in Egypt, as well as observing that the sole piece of evidence they cited in their response on this point was subject to some suspicious editing on their part;<br /> <br />5) I directly challenge their claims that the Muslim Brotherhood has not been implicated in the violent and fatal attacks against the Coptic community in Egypt by citing a report published by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, in addition to reports issued by the Coptic community and articles in the Egyptian press;<br /> <br />6) I revisit the events surrounding the military demonstration by Muslim Brotherhood youth cadres at Al-Azhar University this past December, which prompted the current government crackdown on the organization, as evidence that the intentions of the Brotherhood are not entirely peaceful;<br /> <br />7) I observe that their characterization of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in France, the UOIF, as a “moderate” organization is directly contradicted by recent studies published by their own organization, the Nixon Center, and that most careful researchers have concluded that France’s policy of embracing the Muslim Brotherhood has been a catastrophic failure and fueled Islamic radicalization – the same policy Leiken and Brooke demand the U.S. implement.<br /> <br />On the basis on the extensive evidence I have provided throughout this report, I conclude that when it comes to anything challenging the carefully manicured image of the Muslim Brotherhood crafted by Leiken and Brooke, they resort to the old maxim: see no evil; hear no evil; speak no evil. Other contradicting evidence is steadfastly ignored. In the event that fails, their policy has been: attack the critic. This is hardly the way to determine US foreign policy, but admittedly this is how business is conducted in the think tanks and policy shops of the Beltway intelligentsia.<br /> <br />The previous parts to this rejoinder can be found here:<br /> <br />Showdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Part 1<br /> <br />Showdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Part 2<br /> <br /> <br />Muslim Brotherhood ♥ Leiken and Brooke<br /> <br />To begin the concluding Part 3 of my rejoinder to Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke, I would quickly point out to FrontPage readers that the Muslim Brotherhood is now featuring their response to me on the official Ikhwan website, and promoting it on their home page.<br /> <br /> <br />Leiken and Brooke’s Muslim Brotherhood “Moderates”<br /> <br />Following up on a point I made in Part 2 in my rejoinder to Leiken and Brooke was how virtually all of the “reformists” they claim that they have spoken with in the Muslim Brotherhood over the past year have gone unnamed. We realize the reason that the “many members” of the Brotherhood that Leiken and Brooke spoke with during their Magical Muslim Brotherhood Mystery Tour remain unidentified – to prevent “armchair/internet intellectuals” like me from conducting follow-up research on these alleged “reformists” and “pragmatists” that are supposedly proof of their so-called “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood.” <br /> <br />In their response to my original criticism, they tacitly identify one of these figures:<br /> <br />“Many high- level figures in the Brotherhood take a pragmatic view of Israel. As one explained to us “we may not like it, but we have to accept the fact that Israel exists and is not going anywhere. We must start from this point.”<br /> <br />When following the link they provide, we arrive at an interview conducted by anti-war activist and Christian Science Monitor columnist Helena Cobban with Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh, a member of the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council and the head of the Brotherhood-controlled professional syndicate, the Arab Doctors’ Association.<br /> <br />Following the publication of Part 2 of my rejoinder, I was reminded by my colleague Alyssa Lappen, Senior Fellow at the American Center for Democracy, of the review she gave several months ago (“Islam’s Useful Idiots” The American Thinker [October 23, 2006]) to “pragmatic” statements previously made by El-Futouh, such as these quotes given to the New York Times where he expresses his preference for a “Hezbollah-Iranian agenda” over an “American-Zionist one”:<br /> <br />The Muslim Brotherhood, the Sunni Islamist group founded in Egypt, has been particularly outspoken. Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, a member of its guidance office, said that the United States had invaded Iraq to divide Muslims and that it was better to support a Hezbollah-Iranian agenda than an “American-Zionist” one.<br /> <br />“Which one is more dangerous to the Muslim world?” he said in an interview, before attacking “the regimes who tremble before Iran. They are weak and tattered regimes who don’t acknowledge the will of their people.”<br /> <br />When pressed, though, a vague ambivalence emerges. “Iran would be at the end of our list of enemies, even though it’s not an enemy,” he said. “Let’s combat the American danger on the region before we ‘compete’ with Iran.” (Neil MacFarquhar, “Hezbollah’s Prominence Has Many Sunnis Worried,” New York Times [August 4, 2006]; emphasis added)<br /> <br />Now remember that El-Futuoh was the member of the Muslim Brotherhood tacitly identified by Leiken and Brooke noted for his pragmatism related to Israel. But when pressed by the New York Times, we discover that his pragmatism leads him to embrace the terrorist organization Hezbollah and the terror-supporting regime in Tehran over the democratic states of Israel and America. This is “pragmatism” for the Nixon Center pair.<br /> <br />Lappen also notes more of El-Futouh’s “pragmatism,” endorsing Al-Azhar scholars’ call for jihad against the U.S.:<br /> <br />Islamic scholars had performed their 'basic religious duty' in calling on Muslims to join jihad against the U.S., El Fotouh stated in March 2003. Al Azhar had rightly urged them to 'defend themselves and their faith' against an 'enemy' stepping 'on Muslims' land'—which the scholars called 'a new Crusader battle targeting our land, honour, faith and nation.' Al Azhar's decree, El Fotouh stated, was 'no more than an attempt on the part of its scholars to fulfill their duty before God.' The U.S. had 'plans to enslave the Arab nation,' he also claimed. (“Islam’s Useful Idiots”; link is to Gihan Shahine, “Debating Jihad” Al-Ahram Weekly [March 27-April 2, 2003])<br /> <br />Leiken and Brooke are sure to claim that El-Futouh’s call to fight the “Crusaders” is in line with their distinction between “defensive jihad” and “global jihad”; but it is undeniable that Egypt has not been attacked by the United States, nor is it the national defense forces of Egypt that El-Futouh is supporting to fight the “enemy,” i.e. the United States. El-Futouh is calling for support of terrorists – al-Qaeda terrorists, in fact – in Iraq, who have killed tens of thousands of innocent Iraqi since he made those pronouncements in favor of the Al-Azhar fatwas – as many, if not more, than US forces have accidentally killed.<br /> <br />We also learn a little bit more about El-Futouh from an article in the New York Post last year when El-Fatouh was denied a visa by the Department of Homeland Security to attend a NYU symposium supporting the Brotherhood,<br /> <br />El-Fotouh is believed to have led a radical resurgence of the group in the 1970s, although today he is regarded by many watchdogs as a moderate. <br /> <br />He was also among 62 group leaders sentenced to five years in prison in Egypt in 1995 for their alleged role in a failed coup. (David Andreatta, “NYU in Islam Furor,” New York Post [October 20, 2006])<br /> <br />In 2005, when Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammad Akef told the Egyptian daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat that the organization would back a Mubarak candidacy for President – a surprising conciliatory gesture to the current regime – is was El-Futouh that became enraged and penned a heated editorial in Al-Hayat against the Brotherhood leader for showing signs of compromise with the Egyptian government.<br /> <br />Later I will discuss the Muslim Brotherhood’s governance of the professional syndicates in Egypt, but at this point I should note that in his tenure of the Arab Doctors’ Association, it has been reported that El-Futouh has been responsible for diverting funds from the syndicate to support terrorist activities in Iraq, Chechnya, and Afghanistan, while denying funds be sent to tsunami victims in Indonesia, because that was an act of “divine punishment” against the Muslims there.<br /> <br />In their original Foreign Affairs article, they direct our attention to another alleged Muslim Brotherhood “reformer”:<br /> <br />The United States lost an opportunity to hear from one of these reformers last October when [Kamal] Helbawi—the imam whom we heard deliver a sermon extolling a Jew—was forced off a flight en route to a conference at New York University. This treatment of a figure known for his brave stand against radical Islam and for his public advocacy of dialogue with the United States constitutes yet another bewildering act by the Department of Homeland Security, which provided no explanation. This London-based admirer of Shakespeare and the Brontës appears to be exactly the sort of interlocutor who could help bridge civilizations. Instead, his public humiliation was a gift for the radicals, a bracing serving of “we told you so” on the subject of engaging Americans. (“The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” p. 121)<br /> <br />But at other times when enthusiastic Western supporters, such as Leiken and Brooke, have not been around, Helbawi has had less favorable things to say about Jews, as journalist and counterterrorism expert Steve Emerson reported that he heard first-hand at a 1992 Muslim Arab Youth Association conference:<br /> <br />“Do not take Jews and Christians as allies, for they are allies to each other.”<br /><br />“O’Brothers, the Palestinian cause is not a conflict of borders and land only. It is not even a conflict over human ideology and not over peace. Rather, it is an absolute clash of civilizations, between truth and falsehood. Between two conducts – one satanic, headed by Jews and their co-conspirators—and the other is religious, carried by Hamas, and the Islamic movement in particular and the Islamic people in general who are behind it.” (Steve Emerson, “Muslim Brotherhood Member Barred from United States,” Counterterrorism Blog [October 20, 2006]; cited in Lappen, “Islam’s Useful Idiots”)<br /> <br />With regards to Helbawy, Emerson additionally reports and concludes:<br /> <br />In 1991, Helbawy spoke at a conference hosted by the Islamic Committee for Palestine, a front group that was headed by convicted Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) operative Sami al-Arian. Other speakers at the event include Specially Designated Terrorist and current General Secretary of PIJ, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, the notorious Egyptian “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman (spiritual leader of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center, currently serving a life prison sentence for his role in a plot to blow up New York City landmarks), and PIJ founder and spiritual leader Abdel Aziz Al Awda.<br /> <br />Helbawy’s radicalism and support for terrorism (and terrorists) is both longstanding and well documented. Despite his current protestations and NYU’s willful blindness, U.S. government officials are rightfully wary of his past and level of influence. The Department of Homeland Security deserves credit for keeping Helbawy, and others like him, out of the United States. (ibid.)<br /> <br />It is “reformers” and “pragmatists” like El-Futouh and Helbawy that Leiken and Brooke direct our attention to in support of their claim of a “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood. In light of the present evidence, we would do well to take their claims “with much salt.”<br /> <br /> <br />The Reformists Have Left the Building – Quite a While Ago!<br /> <br />In listening to the clap-trap about how the Muslim Brotherhood is brimming with “reformists” and “moderates,” we should recall a piece of recent Egyptian political history. In 1996, a number of Muslim Brotherhood leaders and members broke away from the organization to found the Al-Wasat (“Center”) Party because of the radicalism and intransigence of the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.<br /> <br />In a 2004 interview, the head of Al-Wasat, Abu al-Ula Madi, who was a senior Brotherhood leader in the Engineering Syndicate, explains that he decided to leave after more than a decades-worth of unsuccessful attempts to “reform” the Brotherhood:<br /> <br />Al-Wasat doesn't only stand for an explicitly Islamist agenda, it actually emerged as a breakaway movement from the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. For over fifteen years Abu al-Ula Madi was himself active in the Brotherhood, rising to a leadership position in the Brotherhood-dominated engineers' trade union.<br /><br />In 1996, together with a few like-minded people, he turned his back on the Muslim Brotherhood. He says that was "after we'd tried for ten years to reform them." (Jürgen Stryjak, “Al-Wasat Party: Democratic and Pluralistic?” Qantara [September 28, 2004])<br /> <br />Many of the reformers within the Muslim Brotherhood left at this time, and others have left since. While Leiken and Brooke are certain to tell us that the group’s supply of “reformists” has been restocked and now represent the majority within the organization, other careful researchers and analysts have admitted that the reformists are far from having won the battle within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood:<br /> <br />The balance between reformers and hardliner differs from one Islamist movement to another. Reformers are clearly the most influential force in the Moroccan PJD and the Egyptian Wasat Party; in fact, the latter was launched by a breakaway reformist faction of the Muslim Brotherhood…The 2004 Wasat Party program calls for establishing a democratic political system in Egypt within the framework of the Islamic marji’iya. In other movements, such as the Jordanian Islamic Action Front and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, however, the reformists have not yet won the battle. (Nathan Brown, Amr Hamzawy, and Marina S. Ottaway, “Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones,” Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Carnegie Paper No. 67 [March 2006], p. 18; emphasis added)<br /> <br />Despite the massive exodus of true reformers and moderates out of the Muslim Brotherhood – a stunning refutation of their “moderate” claims –Leiken and Brooke must assert their unquestioned authority and rely upon the ignorance of their readers, much like Johann Tetzel hawking indulgences in 16th Century Germany, to continue peddling their policy wares.<br /> <br /> <br />If all else fails, blame America First!<br /> <br />As the foundations continue to crumble for Leiken and Brooke’s argument advancing the claim of a “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood, we uncover that they have created an escape plan in case their argument for the “rejecting global jihad” and “embracing democracy” “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” comes crashing down around them. Towards the end of Leiken and Brooke’s response, we come across this critical statement:<br /> <br />“Probably the most important development of the past five years is cited by Poole himself, the “upward trend of Islamic radicalization.” But what Poole ignores is that U.S. policies have been responsible for this radicalization.”<br /> <br />First off, I don’t ignore; I reject it. We only need to look at recent history to see that radicalization was well on the rise long before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. If they had argued that the military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have been used by others in the Middle East to radicalize elements, we would be close to an agreement. However, they say that “U.S. policies have been responsible,” which is an attribution of culpability.<br /> <br />In fact, it was during the 1990s, as Islamic radicalism and terrorism directed at the United States was on a sharp rise, that America was doing the most for Muslims around the world: defending the “Land of the Two Mosques” at the request of the Saudi government, and leading the military campaign alongside most Arab countries to liberate Kuwait; the humanitarian effort directed at ending the man-made famine and tribal warfare in Somalia; forging the Dayton Peace Accords, which stopped the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia; using diplomatic pressure to get Israel to agree to the Oslo Accords, the first substantive diplomatic effort to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and the ongoing US-led NATO mission in support of the Muslims in Kosova. Yet during this period, al-Qaeda was in its ascendancy and Islamic radicalism was on a fast boil throughout the Middle East.<br /> <br />Since 9/11, Leiken and Brooke should remember that it hasn’t been President Bush, Vice President Cheney and former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that has preaching anti-Americanism from the pulpits of mosques throughout the Muslim World; it hasn’t been CBS, NBC, ABC and CNN that has spewed all manner of anti-Jewish propaganda in the Middle East; it isn’t a US-backed Arab regime that’s perpetrating genocide against non-Arab Muslims in Darfur; it hasn’t been Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell that has issued fatwas endorsing terrorism and calling for jihad; and it hasn’t been American and coalition forces soldiers that has been killing tens of thousands of innocent Muslims in horrific terror attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. But nonetheless, Leiken and Brooke want to lay responsibility for all this at the feet of American foreign policy.<br /> <br />It seems here that Leiken and Brooke have gone “native.” They have adopted the exact same rhetoric and justification for terrorism as Osama bin Laden and the Muslim Brotherhood. To blame US foreign policy for Islamic terrorism and radicalism (which goes back long before 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) is just as ridiculous as Sayyid Qutb’s condemnation of American moral laxity and “barbarism” he claims he witnessed in the 1940s. The United States is no more responsible for the terrorism that is afflicting the Middle East today than the mixed sex crowd at the social dance that Qutb attended in the dry town of Greeley, Colorado in 1948 that he claimed was responsible for his jihadist ideology.<br /> <br />With foreign policy realists like the Nixon Center, who needs the Muslim Brotherhood or al-Qaeda for enemies?<br /> <br /> <br />Egypt’s Professional Syndicates and the Muslim Brotherhood Mafia<br /> <br />“Poole charges, again without evidence, that the Brotherhood’s behavior in the syndicates (essentially Egyptian unions) shows that the Brotherhood will one day rule Egypt dictatorially. Corruption and mismanagement are problems for all syndicates, as they are for much of Egyptian society. But careful researchers must parse facts from sour-grapes accusations by political operatives on the losing end.”<br /> <br />Did you catch that “careful researchers” comment? I did too. I assume that they fancy themselves as “careful researchers,” but had they bothered to do their homework, they would have found that there is scholarly research to back up my claim (and I would have been glad to provide them with such had they bothered to ask).<br /> <br />But before we get too much further on this topic, let’s continue with what they have to say about the Brotherhood’s administration of the professional syndicates:<br /> <br />We note a study by the prestigious Cairo-based Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. According to the Arab Strategic Report, in the 2001 Lawyers Syndicate elections, the Brotherhood<br /> <br />presented a list of 24 candidates which included members from outside the brotherhood. The list included 8 brothers, 3 NDP members, one Nasserist, one Labor party member, one liberal Copt, and one Wafd member. The rest were independents….The Brothers were able to score more successes within the lawyers syndicate during 2002. They cooperated successfully with other opposition forces especially with the Nasserists.<br /> <br />Most people wouldn’t realize it, but here we have a very suspicious cut-and-paste quotation. Here’s what they cut out of their quotation of this Al-Ahram Center study in their very convenient ellipsis:<br /> <br />…During those elections, the candidates of the brotherhood were much more representative of their syndicate's interests and less representative of the brotherhood than during any other election. Their election campaigns focused on syndicates issues wrapped in Islamic garb. This was contrary to their traditional practice of advancing an Islamic agenda in the context of syndicates… (emphasis added)<br /> <br />The very point that the “prestigious” Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies was intending to make in their study is that the very election that Leiken and Brooke identify as being fair and competitive was the marked exception, not the rule. And yet with their curious and convenient block-quote editing, they are able to turn the Al-Ahram Center’s analysis on its head – all to make the Brotherhood look its best.<br /> <br />Again, we are offered only half-truths by Leiken and Brooke, and as I’ve charged in my previous critique and I repeat here, the parts they leave out are precisely the points that defeat the heart of their “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood thesis. I realize that the Nixon Center has received sizable grants to arrive at these conclusions, and that this is pro forma behavior for the Beltway intelligentsia, but “armchair/internet intellectuals” such as myself are not so easily fooled.<br /> <br />Getting back to the issue at-hand, they charge me with initiating this line of argument about the connection between the Muslim Brotherhood’s dominance of Egypt’s professional syndicates and their alleged democratic leanings; but in fact, they first raised the Brotherhood’s performance in the syndicates as a demonstration of their “reformist” rehabilitation:<br /> <br />“Such pressure exacerbates differences between various tendencies in the Egyptian Brotherhood. Since the 1980s, middle-class professionals have pushed it in a more transparent and flexible direction. Working within labor unions and professional organizations, these reformers have learned to forge coalitions with and provide services to their constituents.” (“The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” p. 114)<br /> <br />Not long after the Brotherhood began taking over the professional syndicates (teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, etc.) in the early 1990s, it quickly became apparent that despite the fact that they had campaigned on cleaning up corruption, their administration of the syndicates was swiftly setting new lows. Here is one scholar’s analysis several years after the fact: <br /> <br />At a time when the Muslim Brotherhood was criticizing both the government and other secular political forces in the syndicates for falsifying the results of a number of syndicate council elections, they were doing the same thing. In fact, the Muslim Brothers appear to have outwitted the government in this area.<br /> <br />…Some Muslim Brothers have claimed that change in the council leadership of syndicates under their control has taken place more frequently than in other syndicates. These changes, however, have been confined to members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and have taken place in an undemocratic way. (Ninette S. Fahmy, “The Performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian Syndicates: An Alternative Formula for Reform?” Middle East Journal 52:4 [Autumn 1998], p. 559, 560)<br /> <br />As Fahmy chronicles, the Muslim Brotherhood racked up an impressive record of corruption and undemocratic behavior in their governance of the syndicates. Here are some of the examples she cites:<br /> <br />In the 1995 Engineering Syndicate elections, the Brotherhood only submitted 70,000 names of the 220,000 that had paid their annual dues. Most of those omitted from the voting lists were government engineers. Because of the Brotherhood’s rampant voter fraud, the judicial commission was forced to cancel the elections seven times. (ibid., pp. 559-560)<br />During the 1993 Lawyers Syndicate election in Giza, several current and former syndicate officials charged the Brotherhood with leaving out a number of dues paying lawyers, while stuffing voter roles with Brotherhood supporters who did not even live in the Giza district. (ibid., p. 560)<br />In 1990, Christian doctors were prevented from voting in the Doctors Syndicate elections by failing to send them their ballots, and by holding the election on Good Friday. Christians were again the target in 1992, when Muslim Brotherhood officials removed their names from voter roles in the Doctors Syndicate elections in the Daqahiliyya governorate. The same was true in the 1995 Engineers Syndicate elections. Because of rampant corruption by Muslim Brotherhood officials, an independent Association of Egyptian Doctors was formed catering to Christians, secularists and moderate Muslims (ibid.)<br />In 1994, the Central Auditing Agency discovered that $400,000 could not be accounted for from the Engineering Syndicate treasury, that $120,000 had been spent on unrelated religious conferences abroad attended by Brotherhood officials, and another $60,000 had been taken from the pension fund. To help fund their elections, Brotherhood officials had spent $260,000 on advertising and propaganda from syndicate accounts. The Engineering Syndicate was placed under judiciary supervision due to the rampant financial and electoral fraud perpetrated by the Brotherhood (ibid., p. 561)<br />Another audit found that $88,000 had been spent out of the Pharmacists Syndicate accounts for publishing a Muslim Brotherhood magazine. (ibid.)<br /> <br />Maybe next time Leiken and Brooke won’t be so quick to throw around the “without evidence” charge. Wishful thinking, I know.<br /> <br />As with all things related to the Muslim Brotherhood, in one way or another we are quickly brought right back to the terrorism issue, and the Egyptian professional syndicates is no different. One recent analysis discusses how the Muslim Brotherhood has used their control of the professional syndicates to raise funds to support terrorist activities all over the world, including violence directed at the Coptic population in Egypt itself (which Leiken and Brooke deny the Brotherhood has any involvement in; discussed in detail below):<br /> <br />Within these groups, it has a record of corruption, fanaticism, and promoting conflict. The major concern of the Muslim Brotherhood was to raise funds or use those belonging to these institutions in order to support Islamists all over the world, from Chechnya to Afghanistan and Bosnia. Terrorist groups have used these same funds to threaten Egypt's national security, its Christian citizens, and foreign guests--giving a small, horrendous taste of what is to come should they gain power. (Magdi Khalil, “Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood and Political Power: Would Democracy Survive?” Middle East Review of International Affairs 10:1 [March 2006])<br /> <br />Americans saw first-hand on 9/11 the consequences of the radicalism preached by the Muslim Brotherhood in the Egyptian professional syndicates. As the Washington Post reported just days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Mohammad Atta, the terrorist ringleader, began his infamous journey into al-Qaeda in 1990, when he entered the Brotherhood-controlled Engineering Syndicate:<br /> <br />In 1985, Atta entered the architecture school in the engineering department at Cairo University. The Muslim Brotherhood and other religion-based political organizations are banned in Egypt, but the beliefs they represent show up in many seemingly unlikely institutions. One of them was the engineering department.<br /> <br />In 1990, after finishing his studies in architecture, Atta joined what is called an "engineering syndicate," a professional or trade group. Like the school that trained many of its engineers, the syndicate was an unofficial base for the Muslim Brotherhood, where it recruited and propagated its ideas, including the demonization of the United States. (Peter Finn, “A Fanatic’s Quiet Path to Terror,” Washington Post [September 21, 2001], p. A1; see also, John Hooper, “The shy, caring, deadly fanatic,” The Observer (UK) [September 23, 2001])<br /> <br />As a number of reports have noted, Mohammad Atta operated out of a Muslim Brotherhood cell run by Syrians in Hamburg, Germany. From there he would travel to Afghanistan to receive his orders from Osama bin Laden, and eventually, the United States. The rest is one of the most horrific episodes in American history – one we can partially thank the Muslim Brotherhood for.<br /> <br />Finally, one recent report notes a number of articles in the Egyptian press concerning the Muslim Brotherhood’s infiltration of the educational system and how the organization uses that position to propagate Islamic radicalism:<br /> <br />The Muslim Brotherhood, explains Dr. [Imad] Siam, infiltrates the education system: "The first method is planned and organized infiltration by various political Islam organizations, that aim to take control of the [state's] political authorities through direct, meaning violent, political activity, or through propaganda carried out by thousands of political Islam activists in [various] political organizations, unions, and NGOs.<br /> <br />"The second method is indirect infiltration… [carried out] by encouraging wide sectors of society to endorse political Islam's ideology and activity without necessarily joining its political organizations. This latter type of infiltration is the most dangerous and difficult to control…<br /> <br />"[These two types of infiltration] have ultimately turned the education system into the chief production line of sectarian ideas, extremism and irrationality." (“Egyptian Press Criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood’s Infiltration of Egypt’s Education System,” MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1495 [March 9, 2007])<br /> <br />As we saw, the sole piece of evidence Leiken and Brooke cited on their behalf was a jerry-rigged quote from a study that disproved the very assertion that they were attempting to make. And the scholarly studies and reports I’ve cited clearly show that the Brotherhood has rigged elections, plundered syndicate funds to finance their own agendas, and used the syndicates to proliferate radicalism and jihad. So my original point still stands: If they refuse to act in a democratic fashion in the private sphere, why should we remotely believe their behavior would be any different in the civil sphere?<br /> <br /> <br />The Coptic Community: “With Friends Like These…”<br /> <br />“Poole offers unsubstantiated arguments that the “military apparatus” of the Muslim Brotherhood has been attacking the Christian Coptic community. Sectarian violence does occur in Egypt, but the Muslim Brotherhood has not been implicated. On the contrary, the BBC reported that the Muslim Brotherhood supported Coptic Christians demonstrating for greater police protection. The Brotherhood also called one particularly high- profile attack “an attack against all the Egyptian people, Muslim and Copt.” There has been reported cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and Coptic candidates in Egypt, and earlier this year a Christian joined the leadership council of the political party affiliated with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (although he soon resigned for reasons unclear).”<br /> <br />I’m sure the Coptic community in Egypt will be glad to hear that the ongoing lethal attacks directed by the Muslim Brotherhood against their persons, businesses and churches are all just a figment of my imagination!<br /> <br />Here’s their critical contention:<br /> <br />“Sectarian violence does occur in Egypt, but the Muslim Brotherhood has not been implicated.”<br /> <br />But a definite rebuttal to Leiken and Brooke’s agnosticism regarding Muslim Brotherhood-inspired violence directed at the Copts comes from a very authoritative source – the US Commission on International Religious Freedom:<br /> <br />Coptic Christians face ongoing violence from vigilante Muslim extremists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom act with impunity. Egyptian authorities have been accused of being lax in protecting the lives and property of Christians.<br /> <br />…At the end of December 1999, communal violence in the village of al-Kosheh resulted in the deaths of 20 Coptic Christians and one Muslim. In February 2001, a criminal court acquitted 92 of 96 defendants, Muslims and Christians, suspected of crimes committed while participating in that violence. None of the four convicted, all Muslim, was convicted of murder. Coptic religious leaders and families of the victims criticized the verdict and the General Prosecution quickly lodged an appeal. In July 2001, the Court of Cassation ordered a retrial of all the defendants, which opened in November 2001. In February 2003, the Sohag Court again acquitted 92 of the 96 defendants arrested in connection with the Al-Kosheh killings. Of the other four who were convicted, one was sentenced to 15 years for the killing of the sole Muslim victim, while the other three men, all Muslims, received either one or two year sentences. According to the State Department, in March 2003 the public prosecutor appealed the verdict, citing “misapplication of the law and inadequate justification of the verdict.” The case is ongoing. (Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, [May 2004], p. 73; emphasis added)<br /> <br />Not surprisingly, Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mehdi Akef denounced the findings of the USCIRF Report, claiming US interference in Egyptian “domestic affairs.” (“‘Akef Attacks the Report of the American Freedoms Commission,” [August 12, 2004], www.ikhwanonline.com) But Leiken and Brooke ignore the findings of this USCIRF report altogether – a seemingly regular occurrence in their supposed “careful research.”<br /> <br />This testimony of Muslim Brotherhood involvement in anti-Coptic violence has been repeated recently in a comprehensive report of violent attacks issued by the Coptic community itself:<br /> <br />A coordinated action plan appears to exist between the extremist Egyptian media's terrorist-supporting motives, Egypt's radical clerics, and the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s largest and oldest terrorist organization and a group that has, in the past several months, achieved a level of government tolerance. (US Copts Association, Alexandria’s Native Christians under Siege, November 10, 2005)<br /> <br />Maybe the Copts just haven’t heard from Leiken and Brooke how much the Muslim Brotherhood is doing on their behalf?<br /> <br />The Muslim Brotherhood was implicated in a well-publicized incident in Alexandria in 2005, where a Coptic church was accused of selling a CD of a performance of play that was deemed an insult to Islam. Three Copts were murdered, and one brave warrior of jihad stabbed a nun in the chest.<br /> <br />Subsequent media reports on this incident noted that the Brotherhood was behind the violence, which they hoped to use for political advantage in the upcoming parliamentary elections:<br /> <br />Security officials are suggesting that Islamist fundamentalists distributed the CDs to stoke up sectarian tension as a way of tipping the balance in the upcoming electoral contest between Coptic nominee Maher Khellah and the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed El-Badrashini, both of whom are running for a seat in the same Ghorbal district in Alexandria where the tension erupted. The Brotherhood's intention was to sully Khellah's reputation, they said. (Jailan Halawi, “Tip of the Iceberg” Al-Ahram Weekly No. 766 [October 27-November 2, 2005])<br /> <br />That same Al-Ahram article quotes another Egyptian media figure, Adel Hammouda, chief editor of the Al-Fajr newspaper, attributing the violence to the Brotherhood:<br /> <br />Hammouda also blames the Muslim Brotherhood, along with other clandestine organisations and political groups seeking to make gains as the elections near. These groups, he said, "fanned the flames of the strife sparked by the Copts, turning it into a blaze by manipulating Muslims into believing they should rise up in defense of their faith against the Coptic enemy seeking to defame it." (ibid.)<br /> <br />Another example of the Brotherhood’s role inciting Muslim mobs to violence against Copts during the 2005 parliamentary elections is found in this report published by the Free Copts organization:<br /> <br />In a small village called Kafr Salama near Menya El Kamh' in the governorate of Sharkeya (north east of Cairo) some Muslims, mainly young men belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood group , attacked the houses, shops and properties of Christians. This took place after a fight between a Christian and a Muslim in the village, during which the father of the latter dropped dead after going into a diabetic coma when he watched the fight. Things quickly escalated after the rumor spread that "Christians killed Muslims." The naive Christians, knowing the tension was only the result of a normal fight, did not believe things would get any worse.<br /><br />However, members of the Muslim Brotherhood began sending messages to neighboring villages asking for their assistance. Subsequently hundreds of Muslims gathered from different villages, attacking the houses, shops and belongings of Christians. So far, seven houses and one farm have been completely burned, and many houses have been destroyed. The Christian young man who was involved in the initial fight was massacred by the mob of Muslims. Furthermore, the numerous police vans that rushed into the village have been so far unsuccessful in protecting the Christians, most of whom have fled the village. The few Christian families that remain are currently stranded in their houses, awaiting attack by the Muslims, unless protection arrives in due time. Hundreds of Muslims from neighboring villages, screaming "Islam is the solution," are still flooding Kafr Salama and threatening to burn and kill whatever crosses their way.<br /> <br />Yes, those friendly, peace-loving, well-intentioned Muslim Brotherhood rampaging mobs. Of course, Leiken and Brooke are sure to blame the Copts for their skepticism and not accepting the Brotherhood’s multiple demonstrations of friendship.<br /> <br />(For more information on the fears of the Coptic community concerning the Muslim Brotherhood, including the long-stated policy of treating Copts as dhimmis in any Muslim Brotherhood-led government, consult Magdi Khalil, “The Muslim Brotherhood and the Copts” Threatswatch.org [April 2006]; also see Samir Morcos, “Citizens of One State,” Al-Ahram Weekly No. 792 [April 27-May 3, 2006].)<br /> <br /> <br />Jihadis on Parade; or, Everybody was Kung-Fu Fighting!<br /> <br />“Poole charges that the Brotherhood’s December 10th 2006 demonstration at al Azhar University signified “a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'...capable of military action,” and was furthermore a kind of coded message to awaken “sleeper cells.” It is true that some Brotherhood members dressed themselves in ninja-style outfits and performed martial arts demonstrations and military- style exercises. But this was to protest the Egyptian dictatorship’s expulsion of Brotherhood students from their dorms and its intervention in student council elections. It was a stupid, disturbing display, but without violence, despite the hyperventilating of the state- controlled press and the government’s desire to provoke a confrontation. The Brotherhood leadership condemned the demonstrations, apologized (as Poole notes) and rebuked the students, who also apologized for their actions. The Brotherhood’s peaceful response to an increasingly brutal crackdown actually offers evidence of its non-violent character and not of “sleeper cells” or “military action.”<br /> <br />Actually, the quotes they attribute to me (“a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'...capable of military action,”) were actually made by an Egyptian commentator who apparently isn’t convinced by Leiken and Brooke’s apologetics on behalf of the Brotherhood. And the pair apparently hasn’t heard of the literary device called “block quotes,” which seems odd for such seasoned members of the Beltway intelligentsia.<br /> <br />This is what I wrote in my original article:<br /> <br />At present in Egypt many of the organization’s leaders are in jail following an incident this past December where student cadres of the Brotherhood engaged in a military-style demonstration at Al-Ahzar University, which prompted the Mubarak regime’s current crackdown on the Brotherhood. One observer, Jameel Theyabi, described the scene and its possible message in an op-ed for Dar Al-Hayat:<br /> <br />The military parade, the wearing of uniforms, displaying the phrase, 'We Will be Steadfast', and the drills involving combative sports, betray the group's intent to plan for the creation of militia structures, and a return by the group to the era of 'secret cells'...this development comes as a clear Brotherhood announcement that the group is capable of acting and reacting to developments, and by these demonstrations, it is seeking to deliver a news flash that says: "The group is still out there, and is capable of military action, recruitment of new elements, military training and mobilization...I believe that the group's public power display represents a kind of coded message to awaken sleeper cells within Egypt and abroad.<br /> <br />There was no denying that this was an organized Muslim Brotherhood event; the Brotherhood leaders, however, did not anticipate the strong reaction from both the regime and the media. But since the Brotherhood apologized, we’re not allowed to mention it or draw any negative inferences from it. In fact, according to Leiken and Brooke, the military demonstration is supposed to convince us of the Brotherhood’s peaceful intentions and methods!<br /> <br />The Brotherhood’s peaceful response to an increasingly brutal crackdown actually offers evidence of its non-violent character and not of “sleeper cells” or “military action.”<br /> <br />Here they confuse cause and effect: the current brutal crackdown was caused by their al-Qaeda-style military demonstration, not the result of it.<br /> <br />While the incident is easy to over-simplify and can be attributed to a number of factors, to pretend that the incident didn’t happen and that it in no way contradicts Leiken and Brooke’s claim of a “moderate,” peaceful Muslim Brotherhood, is to ignore the evidence staring us in the face, which is essentially what they are asking us to do. These trained military cadres did not materialize out of the thin air, nor was there any claim that this was staged by the regime.<br /> <br />There were media reports of the revival of the Brotherhood’s “secret apparatus” months before the Al-Azhar incident, many of which noted Supreme Guide Mohammad Akef’s vow to send 10,000 Muslim Brotherhood troops to fight alongside Hezbollah against Israel (Al-Arabiya reported that, in fact, members of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood’s Fajr Forces were part of the fighting last summer; Hayyan Nayyouf, “Lebanese Brotherhood reveals their fight alongside Hezbollah in the South” Al-Arabiya [August 1, 2006]).<br /> <br />A report summarizing the discussion at an Open Forum held by the pro-democracy Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo quotes Hamdi Rizk, deputy chief editor of Al-Mussawar, who warned months before the Al-Azhar incident that the Brotherhood had revived its “secret apparatus”:<br /> <br />…the Muslim Brotherhood has already revived its "physical education" division and the "secret organization," a clandestine armed wing of the group. This was achieved through scouting camps. (Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “The Constitution, the Supreme Court and the Armed Forces,” Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies Newsletter [September 2006])<br /> <br />There is another piece to the puzzle that helps shed some light on the atmosphere created by the Muslim Brotherhood’s militia parade at Al-Azhar. During the public opinion firestorm after the Egyptian news media reported on the jihadist Brotherhood rally, one member of the media that had reported on the incident sent a desperate message to the Muslim Brotherhood in fear for his life, apologizing for his report and for taking photos of the event. The Brotherhood published his apology on their website:<br /> <br />"Since, Monday, when Al Masri Al Youm Newspaper published the news of Al-Azhar militias, I have felt sad about what will happen after; there was fear inside me but I did not know that all this would happen.”<br /> <br />I hope that anyone I offended to forgive me; this is because I -I swear by Allah- did not mean to offende (sic) any body. I was just doing my job honestly and I didn’t support one side against the other. (“Al Masri Al Youm Journalist Regrets Parade Photos,” Ikhwanweb.com December 18, 2006)<br /> <br />This reporter’s apology begs the question: why would he be in fear for his life if the Muslim Brotherhood was the peace-loving Islamist group that Leiken and Brooke represent them to be? That the Brotherhood published his letter speaks volumes.<br /> <br />(A full round-up of responses in Egypt to the Brotherhood’s military parade can be found in L. Azuri, “Relations Worsen Between the Egyptian Regime and the Muslim Brotherhood,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 321 [February 2, 2007])<br /> <br /> <br />Is Paris Burning Yet?<br /> <br />The Brotherhood led organization in France, the UOIF, is moderate and collaborates with the conservative government and its Interior Minister and presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy.<br /> <br />Here we have another brazen assault on the truth by Leiken and Brooke, but don’t take the word of this wanna-be “armchair/internet intellectual”: here is a contrary assessment on the UOIF published by Leiken and Brooke’s own organization, the Nixon Center!<br /> <br />Founded in 1983, the Union’s leadership has shown a tendency to radicalism. Its spiritual guide, Shaykh Faisal Mawlawi, sits on the European Council for Fatwa and Research with radical Muslim Brotherhood cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi. Both Mawlawi and Qaradawi have expressed hatred for the United States and Israel, and both have praised and encouraged suicide “martyrdom” operations. The Union has hosted both at its annual convention in Le Bourget, and they have been guests of honor among the Union’s affiliate groups. The Union has also hosted Tariq Ramadan, grandson of Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al Banna, who has had his American visa revoked by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. In 1995, Pasqua denied Ramadan entrance into France after French authorities linked him to an Algerian terrorist group which carried out attacks in Paris. More recently, the Union asked a French television station to cancel a program critical of Ramadan, and denounced the journalist who produced it. Union officials have also systematically defended Hamas leaders such as the late Sheik Ahmed Yassin and Abdelaziz Rantissi, and have raised money for Hamas through a French organization called the Comité de Bienfaisance et de Secours aux Palestiniens (The Committee for Palestinian Charity and Aid), which the U.S. Treasury Department has called a “primary fundraiser of Hamas.” (Glen Feder, “The Muslim Brotherhood in France,” The Nixon Center, In the National Interest [September 2005]; emphasis added; footnotes in the original)<br /> <br />Feder has recently repeated his charge that the UOIF is one of the forces of radicalism responsible for enflaming the Muslim immigrant youth in France, once again, in one of the Nixon Center’s own publications!<br /> <br />Religion is not the prime reason for the riots, but it is one important element. The current generation of young Muslim immigrants in France no longer adheres to the pious Tabligh movement of their parents, which peaked in the 1970s and 1980s. The Tabligh movement, which was one of the most important Islamic movements by the end of the twentieth century, originated in the late 1920s in India and emphasized the strict imitation of Muhammad’s life instead of the politicization of Islam. Part of the reason for this shift is that in 1997, in an effort to strike a compromise between preserving the rights of their minority groups and protecting traditional French secularist principles, France decided to streamline powerful Islamic organizations into one unified coalition called Le Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council for the Muslim Religion). While the French government hoped that this would create one moderate and unified voice within the Muslim community, its effort backfired.<br /> <br />The results of the election held amid the Muslim population for the council was the victory of a fundamentalist Islamic organization: the Muslim Brotherhood’s Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF). Through the enormously successful efforts of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF) and figures like Tariq Ramadan, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology has spread like wildfire among French youth. The Muslim Brotherhood is not simply a religious movement, but a global social movement that promotes a version of Islam that adamantly rejects secularized political and social institutions. (Glen Feder, “Paris Still Smolders,” The Nixon Center, The National Interest [December 14, 2006]; emphasis added)<br /> <br />Feder tells us that the efforts by the French government to reach out to the UOIF, which Leiken and Brooke tell us is evidence of the organizations so-called “moderation,” has completely backfired on the French (I will forsake snide comments on their ironic mention of the Brotherhood’s “collaboration” – a term packed with some meaning in a French context). We should remember that this is precisely the policy that they demand that the U.S. adopt. Maybe they’re eager for it to backfire on the U.S. as well!<br /> <br />Another recent assessment by Lorenzo Vidino, a noted and frequently-published Muslim Brotherhood expert, charges in an article published earlier this month in the Dutch weekly, Opinio, that most of the Brotherhood’s public image of non-violence (one crafted by Brotherhood enthusiasts in the West…I won’t mention any names) is nothing but a duplicitous façade intended to mask their violent rhetoric and support for terrorism:<br /> <br />In the West violence and confrontation are replaced by a cleverly engineered mix of penetration of the system through appeasement and simultaneous radicalization of the Muslim population. Its leaders publicly vow the group’s dedication to integration and democracy, representing themselves as mainstream, and seeking to portray themselves as the representatives of the various Western Muslim communities in the media and in dialogues with Western governments. Yet, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While Brotherhood representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, the group’s mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations.<br /> <br />…[T]he Brotherhood’s renunciation of violence seems more opportunistic than genuine, considering that its European members use fiery rhetoric to endorse terrorist operations in the Middle East. While they are quick to condemn violence in the West to avoid becoming political pariahs, they do not refrain from approving of it elsewhere, notably in Palestine and Iraq, because they believe they can get away with it. It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that should it become convenient for them to do so, the ever-flexible Brotherhood would embrace violent tactics in the West as well. (Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Holland,” Opinio; reprinted in English at Counterterrorism Blog [April 6, 2007])<br /> <br />This two-faced nature of the Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Europe and North America is a reflection of the mother Muslim Brotherhood organization in Egypt, to which the former head of the Security Intelligence Service of the DGSE (the French Secret Service), Alain Chouet, one of the leading experts on the Islamist movement in the Western intelligence community, attests:<br /> <br />The "democratic conversion" of Mohammad Mehdi Akef, grand master of the Brotherhood in Egypt, the vituperative comments by Ayman Zawahiri on the Egyptian and Jordanian Brothers and their support for the democratic process, the apparent moderated discourse of Tariq Ramadan towards the European institutions should not fool anyone. Like every fascist movement on the trail of power, the Brotherhood has achieved perfect fluency in double-speak. They are able to command all the possible means of accession to the control of the masses, and to power. (Alain Chouet, “The Association of Muslim Brothers: Chronicle of a Barbarism Foretold,” European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center Background Analysis [June 4, 2006]; emphasis added)<br /> <br />One of the consequences of Western governments embracing the Muslim Brotherhood is that it has crowded out truly moderate Muslim organizations and denied them the legitimacy they should be granted. Because of the legitimacy that the Western governments bestow on the Muslim Brotherhood-backed groups, these organizations are relieved of any responsibility to encourage assimilation, and instead, promote radicalism:<br /> <br />At present, the French government’s efforts to encourage moderation and Muslim toleration of non-Muslims have backfired. Instead, the Conseil Française du Culte Musluman has marginalized more moderate institutions like the Mosque de Paris in favor of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups. These new groups have cast aside the goals of integration and adherence to French values, and instead are implementing an outside agenda. As Zuhair Mahmood said, “We are pursuing two goals. The first is an authentic Islam, authentic Muslims. The second is to be in conformity with the rules of society, with the laws of the Republic. It is not easy. It is not always possible.” This is partly because their brand of Islam is global in its aspirations, and supports terrorist groups like Hamas as a means of spreading it. Lhaj Thami Breze, president of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France, summed up their stance on religious accommodation within a secular state when he said, “The Qur’an is our constitution,” a saying that is also a motto of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Feder, “The Muslim Brotherhood in France”; emphasis added)<br /> <br />Lorenzo Vidino adds that not only does the acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood groups in the West push out the moderates and encourages radicalization; it actually has the effect of speeding up the process:<br /> <br />What most European politicians fail to understand is that by meeting with radical organizations, they empower them and grant the Muslim Brotherhood legitimacy. There is an implied endorsement to any meeting, especially when the same politicians ignore moderate voices that do not have access to generous Saudi funding. This creates a self-perpetuating cycle of radicalization because the greater the political legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood, the more opportunity it and its proxy groups will have to influence and radicalize various European Muslim communities. The ultimate irony is that Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna dreamed of spreading Islamism throughout Egypt and the Muslim world. He would have never dreamed that his vision might also become a reality in Europe. (Lorenzo Vidino, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Conquest of Europe,” Middle East Quarterly 12:1 [Winter 2005])<br /> <br />Nixon Center national security analysts fail to understand it as well, it seems.<br /> <br />(For more on the radicalism of the Brotherhood’s organizations in France, Germany and England, see Lorenzo Vidino, “Aims and Methods of Europe’s Muslim Brotherhood” Hudson Institute Center on Islam, Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology Vol. 4 [November 2006], pp. 22-44; also, “Glorifying the Radicals,” Wall Street Journal (Europe), July 18, 2005, p. A8)<br /> <br /> <br />Conclusion<br /> <br />In the two months since their Foreign Affairs article first appeared, Leiken and Brooke have had a number of critics offer a counsel of caution in their bid to mainstream the Muslim Brotherhood – counsel they have decidedly rejected.<br /> <br />Given all of the qualifications that Leiken and Brooke have been forced to make to their thesis since their Foreign Affairs piece first appeared, it would be fair to ask the pair exactly what they now think is “moderate” about the Muslim Brotherhood at all?<br /> <br />Much like street hustlers selling Rolex watches for $100, Leiken and Brooke are peddling goods quite different from what they claim. After assurances from Leiken and Brooke that the Muslim Brotherhood “embraces democracy,” we find that by “democracy” the Brotherhood have something very different in mind from what the West understands the concept to be. There is no expectation that the Muslim Brotherhood will honor human rights any more than the Mubarak regime currently does, and evidence in hand to believe that their behavior would be worse; there are no assurances that minorities, such as the Copts or women, will be recognized as full citizens in Egypt; there is no expectation that elections would be any more free or fair; and after hearing their claim that the reformists are surging within the Brotherhood, we discover that most of the moderates have left the Muslim Brotherhood already, frustrated by the institutional and ideological obstinacy of its leadership – the very leaders whom Leiken and Brooke argue the US should embrace. Lastly, we find that the very “moderates” within the Brotherhood that they identify openly support terrorism and identify America as their enemy. That last discovery is perhaps the most damning of them all with regards to the arguments made by the Brotherhood’s enthusiasts in Washington DC.<br /> <br />Thus, in conclusion, when it comes to the radicalism and promotion of violence by the Muslim Brotherhood, Leiken and Brooke have closely followed the old maxim: see no evil; hear no evil; speak no evil.<br /> <br />It’s for this reason that when any Muslim Brotherhood leader says or does something departing from the carefully crafted script that Leiken and Brooke attempt to peddle, they must be quickly categorized as “hard-line” (Jordanian IAF MPs paying their respects to the family of the late Iraqi al-Qaeda leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi), “controversial” (late Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mustafa Mashour statements on democracy), or a “doddering, slightly embarrassing old uncle (current Supreme Guide Mohammad Akef’s comments on virtually any topic). Any evidence that contradicts the basic tenets of their “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” thesis must be ignored and suppressed, and any critic willing to offer a different analysis or presenting verboten evidence is quickly the victim of their ad hominem attacks.<br /> <br />They take their best shot at me:<br /> <br />“But an armchair (or maybe internet) intellectual, happier to sound off than to act wisely, prefers to exhibit the weeds in the Muslim Brotherhood to the uninformed crowd. In this way, to switch metaphors, we lose the forest for the trees. A wise policy demands a full picture.”<br /> <br />But it is precisely the full picture that they are unwilling to contemplate. As I demonstrated in my first article, and have thoroughly documented in this extensive rejoinder, Leiken and Brooke must deliberately evade, downplay or explain away anything that contradicts their thesis. Whatever evidence is overwhelming to their position is simply ignored as if it didn’t exist. And if all else fails, attack the critic! Why must they sink to ad hominem? Because their whole argument is predicated on smoke and mirrors. Yes, there may be reformists all over the Middle East associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that the US can and should deal with, but that has not been their argument.<br /> <br />Instead, they are the purveyors of the myth of the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood: one that “rejects global jihad,” which as we discovered is nothing more than a fictional category and a diversionary tactic intended to redefine the terrorism that the Brotherhood preaches and actively supports, and is a distinction that the Muslim Brotherhood leaders themselves are not willing to draw; and one that “embraces democracy,” which we learned bears absolutely no resemblance to democracy as we know it – equality of citizens, rule of law, separation of the secular and religious spheres, etc. With such a radical proposal contrary to all well-established facts, they would do better to argue that the Muslim Brotherhood “rejects democracy” and “embraces global jihad.”<br /> <br />How embarrassing it must be that an “armchair/internet intellectual” like myself is able to so easily slice and dice through their obfuscation and mendacity like a Ginsu knife! This is why they protest so loudly about my “exhibiting the Muslim Brotherhood’s weeds.”<br /> <br />I readily confess that I have not had my pockets stuffed with grant money to afford me the opportunity to take the Magical Muslim Brotherhood Mystery Tour, sipping tea and smoking the hookah with Muslim Brotherhood leaders from North Africa to the Arabian Gulf. But I have not prostituted myself and allowed myself to be blinded to the abundant evidence that flatly contradicts the most basic elements to their argument. If that is what being an “armchair/internet intellectual” represents, I proudly embrace it!<br /> <br />If anything, Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke have shown us that the Beltway foreign policy/national security intelligentsia just isn’t what it used to be.<br /> <br />As for wise policy, let me conclude with this thought from another skeptic who cautions us against embracing Islamist radicals as part of US foreign policy:<br /> <br />In essence, then, the U.S. government should promote democrats, not just democracy. Nonviolent Islamist parties, such as they are, have earned about as much claim for attention and affection as neo-Nazi parties in Europe or Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front in France. We should not encourage political engagement with Islamists. Instead of moderating the radicals, let us commit ourselves to the project of empowering the moderates. We can do that only if we are more discriminate in how we promote democracy in the Middle East. (Robert Satloff, “U.S. Policy towards Islamists: Engagement versus Isolation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 24, 2005)Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-73613768700744440452008-07-10T22:01:00.000-07:002008-07-10T22:07:16.828-07:00Showdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Part IIBy Patrick Poole, Frontpage Magazine | Tuesday, April 17, 2007<br />Having considered in Part 1 the false distinction between “defensive jihad” and “global jihad” drawn by Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke in their response to me last week here at FrontPage, “A Response to Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood’”, today I turn my attention to several national affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East – the Palestinian terrorist organization HAMAS, the pro-HAMAS Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan, the al-Qaeda-linked Islamic Constitution Movement (ICM) in Kuwait, and the genocidal National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan. The activity of these respective Brotherhood affiliates, and their ties to the main Muslim Brotherhood group in Egypt, severely undercuts Leiken and Brooke’s assertion of a “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood.)<br /><br />HAMAS and the Brotherhood: Strained Relations?<br /><br />1) “Poole thinks that we only dare to treat Hamas “obliquely.” Hamas has murdered Israeli civilians and refuses to recognize the Jewish state, leading many observers to conclude that it wishes to exterminate it. But it is simply not “one of the most active fronts” of global jihad as claimed by Poole. The acrimony between Hamas and al Qaeda, the sustained fury with which the jihadists criticize Hamas for its policy of waging jihad for territory (in Israel) rather than religion (against all Jews) is documented in our article.<br /> <br />“As the Palestinian arm of the Brotherhood (but the relationship is more strained than Poole believes), Hamas adheres to the Brotherhood policy of “defensive jihad” and has never expanded its conflict to America. Many high- level figures in the Brotherhood take a pragmatic view of Israel. As one explained to us “we may not like it, but we have to accept the fact that Israel exists and is not going anywhere. We must start from this point.”<br /> <br />Let’s look at their initial Foreign Affairs piece to see what exactly was “documented in our article” concerning HAMAS:<br /> <br />“Even on the central issue of Israel, each national organization calls its own tune. Every Muslim Brotherhood leader with whom we spoke claimed a willingness to follow suit should Hamas—the Palestinian offshoot of the Brotherhood—recognize the Jewish state. Such earnest professions may be grounded in the confident assumption of Hamas recalcitrance, but that position nonetheless stands in sharp relief to that of most jihadists. As Zawahiri expresses the jihadist view, “No one has the right, whether Palestinian or not, to abandon a grain of soil from Palestine, which was a Muslim land, which was occupied by infidels”<br /> <br />… However, the Brotherhood’s failure to stress the religious dimension incenses the jihadists, who mock the Brotherhood (including Hamas) for conducting jihad “for the sake of territory” rather than for the sake of Allah.”<br /> <br />In total, there were only three mentions of HAMAS in their entire article, and they were found within these four sentences. No mention is made whatsoever in their original article of their terrorist activities, despite the fact that this is a regular sticking point between advocates of the “moderation” of the Brotherhood and critics of that position. In context of how large this problem looms for Leiken and Brooke, and short shrift they give it, I would say again that their treatment is “oblique” at best. More like downright evasive.<br /> <br />If it’s they argue that the relationship is “more strained than what Poole believes”, then I would contend that the relationships between the Brotherhood leadership in Cairo and HAMAS, as well as al-Qaeda and HAMAS, are closer than what Leiken and Brooke are willing to admit.<br /> <br />As I reminded readers in my previous critique of their Foreign Affairs article, HAMAS is a self-identified branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, as is claimed in their own charter:<br /> <br />The Islamic Resistance Movement is one of the wings of Moslem Brotherhood in Palestine. Moslem Brotherhood Movement is a universal organization which constitutes the largest Islamic movement in modern times. It is characterized by its deep understanding, accurate comprehension and its complete embrace of all Islamic concepts of all aspects of life, culture, creed, politics, economics, education, society, justice and judgment, the spreading of Islam, education, art, information, science of the occult and conversion to Islam. (HAMAS Charter, Article 2, emphasis added)<br /> <br />If Leiken and Brooke want to continue to claim that relations are strained between the Egyptian organization and their Palestinian brothers, someone should go over there and tell the respective parties. (I nominate the Nixon Center duo to go talk to the “democracy embracing” HAMAS. Do I hear a second?)<br /> <br />Take, for instance, the less-than-strained behavior exhibited between the two last year when the Brotherhood leaders extended their advice and active support for the Palestinian Authority elections where HAMAS won a majority and took control of the government. One of the first HAMAS operatives warmly received in Cairo by the Brotherhood in the run-up to the PA elections was “mother of martyrs” Miriam Farhat, who several years ago appeared on a HAMAS propaganda video urging her sons to launch attacks against Israeli soldiers and civilians, and all three eventually responded to her call. Did Leiken and Brooke run into “mother of murder” Miriam while they were waiting to have afternoon tea with Supreme Guide Mohammad Akef? I doubt they would tell us if they did, though she may be one of their sources for the supposed “strained relations”.<br /> <br />As should be clear by now, whatever differences and disputes exist between the Brotherhood and HAMAS (much like there can be in any organization, corporation or family), to claim that there is somehow some irreparable breach between the two is pure fiction.<br /> <br />2) “Hamas has murdered Israeli civilians and refuses to recognize the Jewish state, leading many observers to conclude that it wishes to exterminate it. But it is simply not “one of the most active fronts” of global jihad as claimed by Poole.”<br /> <br />Take a moment and read those two sentences again. (Go ahead. I’ll wait.)<br /> <br />I will note only in passing their patently absurd dismissal that the “defensive jihad”/terrorist campaign against Israel “is simply not ‘one of the most active fronts’ of global jihad”. It is statements like these that make it difficult, if not impossible, to take Leiken and Brooke seriously. The tragic part is that they are serious and are recognized card-carrying members of the Beltway intelligentsia, and listened to by policymakers.<br /> <br />But what if we were to take their statements at face value in light of their “defensive jihad”/”global jihad” distinction they have demanded is so important to understanding the “moderation” of the Muslim Brotherhood. The first position they identify with the Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS; the second they identify with al-Qaeda. Has there been any recent movement between the two positions? In fact there has been.<br /> <br />During the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict last summer, none other than “Crazy Uncle” Ayman al-Zawahiri took to the airwaves to proclaim al-Qaeda’s solidarity with the conflict against the “Zionists”, and acknowledge this conflict’s role in the context of the larger “global jihad”:<br /> <br />In keeping with Al-Qaeda's belief in a global clash of civilizations, al-Zawahiri begins by stating that the "war with Israel" is not a conflict over treaties, nationalism, or disputed borders, but rather a "jihad in the path of God." The jihad aims not only for the "liberation of Palestine," but also "all land that was the realm of Islam, from Andalusia to Iraq."<br /> <br />Al-Zawahiri claims that the Israeli weapons that are "tearing apart the bodies of Muslims in Gaza and Lebanon" are provided and paid for by "all the countries of the crusader alliance," which must be made to "pay the price."<br /> <br />"How can we be silent?" he asks, enumerating a long list of heroes from Islamic history and promising that "we have once again taken to the field." (Dan Rimmage, “Al-Qaeda Addresses the Jihad-Versus-Resistance Conflict”, RFE/RL [July 31, 2006])<br /> <br />Here we see the convergence of the “defensive jihad” and “global jihad” positions. As I noted in my original article, it is precisely at this point that Mohammad Akef also announced his solidarity with Hezbollah and vowed to send 10,000 jihadists to fight alongside the Shi’ite terrorist group against the “Zionists” – an announcement that they go out of their way to dismiss:<br /> <br />“Poole points to statements of Muhammed Mahdi Akef, the current General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, promising to send 10,000 volunteers to the Lebanon conflict. These statements should be seen for what they are; demagogic posturing and populist rhetoric in the effort to capitalize on the very strong support for Hezbollah in the Arab street. Indeed, the 10,000 never materialized, and many Brothers we spoke with expressed deep embarrassment at Akef’s irresponsible statements.”<br /> <br />These statements hardly represent the sum total of the Brotherhood’s open support for Hezbollah last summer, and Akef was not alone in banging the drums of war within the organization. As Eli Lake of the NY Sun reported (“Leading Saudi Sheik Pronounces Fatwa against Hezbollah”), the Brotherhood sponsored a massive Friday afternoon rally in support of Hezbollah at the most important mosque in Cairo, Al-Ahzar. He also reported:<br /> <br />Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, however, has not rejected Hezbollah. In the last three days the organization has been condemning the shelling of Lebanon in Egypt’s parliament and pledged solidarity. One member who deals with the press yesterday said, “Of course we are supporting the resistance. We have no choice.”<br /> <br />The Brotherhood’s press spokesman must not have been among the “many Brothers” that Leiken and Brooke spoke to (who again have all gone unnamed thus far). And not everyone in Egypt saw Akef as the “doddering, slightly embarrassing old uncle” that they describe when he promised 10,000 jihadists for the struggle against the “Zionists” and calling for the assassination of Arab leaders that had not risen to his level of response on the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict.<br /> <br />It is here in the convergence of al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood on this issue that we see that Leiken and Brooke’s “defensive jihad”/”global jihad” distinction is nothing more than an intellectual abstraction intended to justify the behavior of the Brotherhood, yet maintaining a fictional separation from al-Qaeda for American audiences still sensitive about that whole 9/11 thing.<br /> <br />This reveals the absurdity of their “rejecting global jihad” claim of the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood: the “defensive jihad” that the Brotherhood justifies against the “Zionists” in Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the “American imperialists” in Iraq is in no way different than the “global jihad” against the “Jews and Crusaders” that al-Qaeda is also waging in Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq (among other locations). Even an “armchair/internet intellectual” like me can figure that out, but apparently not card-carrying members of the Beltway intelligentsia.<br /> <br />3) “…Hamas adheres to the Brotherhood policy of ‘defensive jihad’ and has never expanded its conflict to America.”<br /> <br />I really feel sorry for these guys; they suffer from really poor timing. The day before their response was published last week, a report emerged that entirely undercuts this claim.<br /> <br />Last week a video statement was made public by a new organization, Iraqi HAMAS, which according to one international media report is affiliated with the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood delegation in the Iraqi Parliament. This video shows Iraqi HAMAS forces engaged in “defensive jihad” by bringing down a US Apache helicopter and attacking US troops. Bill West, a contributor to Counterterrorism Blog, explains:<br /> <br />Today, a report surfaced in Adnkronos International (AKI) concerning a new terrorist group in Iraq calling itself “Iraqi Hamas.” Iraqi Hamas has apparently claimed responsibility for attacking and bringing down a US helicopter in Baghdad on Tuesday. The AKI report goes on to state that Iraqi Hamas is believed to be linked to the Islamist party in the Iraqi parliament (serious in its own right) and to the local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.<br /> <br />Clearly, these reports are worthy of further investigation and presumably the US military and Intelligence agencies are doing just that. That an operationally active terrorist organization in Iraq that has attacked US military personnel may have links to the Muslim Brotherhood should not surprise serious counter-terrorism professionals. Those US diplomats and politicians who believe the Muslim Brotherhood should be engaged as a peace partner should consider reports as the one just noted in AKI and all the available Intelligence material that surely exists related to this issue. (Bill West, “Some US Diplomats and Politicians Think MB = “Moderate” Brotherhood – They Should Think Twice,” Counterterrorism Blog, April 10, 2007; source article, ADNKronos International, “Iraq: Helicopter Attack Claimed by ‘Iraqi Hamas” April 10, 2007)<br /> <br />I suspect that Leiken and Brooke will respond to this new report by claiming that the relations between “Iraqi HAMAS” and the Muslim Brotherhood is “more strained than what Poole believes”, but the fact still remains that the Iraqi HAMAS is now killing Americans. If it’s Palestinian HAMAS, Iraqi HAMAS, or Kuwaiti HAMAS – all of which proclaim their association with the Muslim Brotherhood organization – that is killing US soldiers in the Middle East, is there really much of a difference from a US policy perspective?<br /> <br />Of course, Leiken and Brooke might believe that killing US soldiers is justified by the Islamic doctrine of “defensive jihad”, which as we saw earlier they attempt to equate with Christian “just war” teaching. I’ll leave it to them to clarify that point, but will quickly note that they attach the blame for these activities, not to the Muslim Brotherhood, but to the US itself. More on that later.<br /> <br />4) “Many high- level figures in the Brotherhood take a pragmatic view of Israel. As one explained to us “we may not like it, but we have to accept the fact that Israel exists and is not going anywhere. We must start from this point.”<br /> <br />Who exactly are these “many high- level figures in the Brotherhood” that “take a pragmatic view of Israel”? They only tacitly identify one – Dr. Abdel Monem Abul-Futouh, who is on the Brotherhood’s Guidance Council – in a link to someone else’s blog and provide absolutely no evidence themselves that his views are anywhere near representative of the organization’s leadership. Abul-Fatouh’s shrug of the shoulders while muttering “they’re not going anywhere” is at best the minority report of the Muslim Brotherhood’s official position on the state of Israel.<br /> <br />In fact, Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohammad Mahdi Akef has given us plenty of enlightenment on the “pragmatic view of Israel” that is shared by “many high-level figures in the Brotherhood”. In an interview last year with Egypt Today, he reiterated the organization’s long-term objective of seeing the state of Israel destroyed:<br /> <br />While he asserts that the revision of Egyptian-Israeli relations is not among the immediate objectives of the Brothers’ MPs, he insists that his group still does not recognize the state of Israel — and recently landed himself in trouble for first denying the Holocaust, then backtracking from his comments amid the domestic and international uproar that followed. “We consider them [Israelis] an aggressive people who occupied a land unjustly. We will fight it by working on the progress of our nation. Ultimately, Israel would have no existence. At that point, if the Jews decide to live among us and share the same duties and rights as genuine citizens, they will be welcomed. However, they will never be able to live under an unjust aggressive state, God willing,” says Akef. (Noha El-Hennawy, “Around the Bloc,” Egypt Today [March 2006], emphasis added)<br /> <br />It should be noted that when Akef says “we consider…” and “we will fight…” he’s speaking on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nor is this remotely the first time that he had indulged in such rhetoric:<br /> <br />In an interview with the Egyptian weekly al-Ahram last week, the 77-year old Akef, who spent 20 years in prison, said: “I have declared that we will not recognize Israel, which is an alien entity in the region. And we expect the demise of this cancer soon. If they want to live with us as normal citizens sharing our rights and duties then we don't mind. But to remain an occupying tyrannical country, then this will not happen, God willing.” (Khaled Abu Toameh, “Hamas coordinates with ‘Brotherhood’”, Jerusalem Post [Dec. 20, 2005])<br /> <br />An actual “reformist” in Tunisia, Abdelwahab Meddeb, has offered a first-hand account describing an earlier Akef’s Holocaust-denial tirade:<br /> <br />"...I believe the speaker was the current [spiritual] guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Mahdi 'Akef. He was pounding his words like a political propagandist, yelling his advice and his threats from the heart of the mosque... He was condemning the passivity and cowardliness of the Mulsim countries and masses, while praising the Iranian president and his courageous stand, in particular with regards to Israel... A few days later the press published an announcement by the same 'Akef condoning the Iranian president's denial of the Holocaust. According to ['Akef, the Holocaust] is nothing but a myth intended to legitimize [the existence of] Israel...” (Nathalie Szerman, “Tunisian Reformist Abdelwahab Meddeb: It's Up To the Arab to Take the Courageous Step Of Questioning His Faith,” MEMRI Inquiry and Analysis No. 315 [January 10, 2007])<br /> <br />This anti-Jewish tirade by Akef – again, who is the top official in the Muslim Brotherhood organization, no matter how much Leiken and Brooke are advised to take his statements “with much salt” – was delivered in a Friday sermon at the prominent Al-Ahzar Mosque in Cairo, apparently just days before he issued a weekly statement offering support to Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust denials and vows to “wipe Israel off the map”.<br /> <br />The “many brothers” holding to the “pragmatic view” of Israel’s existence that Leiken and Brooke refer to have limited their public statements to shoulder shrugs and mutterings to attentive Western policy wonks as they hit the hookah together. If we are to believe that they are the dominant voice within the Brotherhood, these “many brothers” need to be much more vocal.<br /> <br />Crossing Jordan<br /> <br />“Poole makes much of the fact that four very hard-line members of a Jordanian political party (the IAF) affiliated with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (and officially recognized by the Jordanian government) visited the family of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the top terrorist in Iraq. We know something about Zarqawi- we wrote the first full account of his emergence as a terrorist leader, and a follow-up article documenting his challenge to Bin Laden. (Both of these articles, by the way, ran in The Weekly Standard, hardly the home of the “progressives” and “Democrats” among whom Poole demagogically places us). <br /> <br />“Of the four legislators who made the visit, three represented Zarqawi’s hometown (and the fourth was born in Faloujah, now the Israeli town of Kiryat Gat). The IAF’s base of support is in and around Palestinian camps and traditionally religious constituencies such as Salt and Zarqa. The IAF, mirroring the views of most Jordanians (and indeed most in the Middle East), very strongly opposed the war in Iraq and the U.S. presence there. While this does not excuse the deputy’s repulsive behavior, it also says very little about the Brotherhood’s overall stance on jihad. The IAF leadership distanced itself from the parliamentarian’s actions, and Jordanians were justifiably outraged at the IAF.<br /> <br />There is one critical statement here made that I want to highlight:<br /> <br />“The IAF leadership distanced itself from the parliamentarian’s actions…”<br /> <br />Let me be clear: this claim is nothing short of a categorical lie.<br /> <br />Instead of distancing themselves from the “repulsive behavior”, as Leiken and Brooke assert, when the Jordanian government arrested the four, the IAF rose to their defense and threatened to bring down the government in response. The head of the IAF, Zaki Saad Bani Rashid, engaged in behavior that bordered on a coup d’etat, as one analyst explained:<br /> <br />As reported in Al-Hayat (“Amman - Strident Declaration Inflames Confrontation with the Government and a Decision to Dissolve ‘The Islamic Centers Association’ Expected”) on Tuesday, the ill-received mourning for Zarqawi was followed by a declaration published by the “National Jordanian Conference” headed by the general secretary of the IAF, Zaki Saad Bani Rashid. In terms described by Al-Hayat as “inflammatory,” the declaration called for a new government which would break off cooperation with Israel and the United States, recognize Hamas, and provide assistance to the “resistance” in Palestine and Iraq. The Jordanian government responded by talking about the imminent creation of a “temporary administration” which would take over the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic centers, a suggestion interpreted to mean that they would be abolished. (Kirk H. Sowell, “Jordan-Muslim Brotherhood Conflict Heats Up After Zarqawi Homage” Threatswatch.org, July 5, 2006)<br /> <br />When Bani-Rashid was eventually forced by the threat of a government takeover of the IAF (the “temporary administration” mentioned above) to finally apologize for the four member’s actions, a number of IAF leaders resigned from the IAF’s governing Shura Council, because they were upset with Bani-Rashid’s apology and that three of the Zarqawi mourners were charged, the apology notwithstanding.<br /> <br />Remember that this incident occurred just months after al-Qaeda operatives, acting under orders from Zarqawi in Iraq, killed 59 people and injured more than one hundred in three coordinated hotel bombings in downtown Amman. Imagine four Democratic members of Congress paying a condolence call to the family of 9/11 ringleader, Mohammad Atta (on second thought, that might be too easy to imagine). The actions of the IAF leadership in response to this crisis were roundly condemned, as this editorial by the General Manager of Al-Arabiya TV exemplifies:<br /> <br />Instead of renouncing their colleagues’ behavior and supporting their country, members of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood treated them heroically and threatened to withdraw from politics, under feeble pretexts… The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan ought to make up its mind: it can either support its own citizens or al-Qaeda’s terrorists. It is no longer possible to support terrorists shamelessly. The tape of al-Zarqawi where he praised the Amman bombings leaves no space for neutrality. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan should make it clear whether they are with their fellow citizens or their fellow “brothers”. (Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed, “Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood vs. its Own People!” Asharq Al-Awsat, June 22, 2006)<br /> <br />Yet again we see that the rosy, apologetic picture of the Muslim Brotherhood that Leiken and Brooke paints for us is significantly different from reality. Maybe they are in their Impressionist policy period?<br /> <br />Since Leiken is quick to claim his superior knowledge relating to al-Zarqawi, he might recall that it was the IAF that pushed for the terrorist leader’s release from prison, along with a number of other al-Qaeda members, in 1999. The Jordanian government agreed to the release of Zarqawi and his associates in order to “engage” the so-called “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood – a policy that had catastrophic consequences and one that Leiken and Brooke demands that the US itself adopt.<br /> <br />We should also recall that on the same day that the horrific 11/9 Amman hotel bombings occurred, a report by Nasr Al-Majali was published by Elaph warning that splits were developing within the IAF, with the Palestinian faction wanting to appoint Zarqawi himself as their leader, as long as he gave up “slaughter, terror and murder”! That evening the IAF East Jordan faction received Zarqawi’s murderous response to their leadership offer.<br /> <br />And as for the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, it should be noted that analysts have observed a rapid trend of radicalization of the IAF thanks to their Palestinian comrades, HAMAS.<br /> <br />Traditionally, the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders have been men of East Bank origin who have developed a modus vivendi with the regime that provided them with wide latitude in social and cultural matters in exchange for political support to the Hashemite ruling family. Yet recent years have witnessed the emergence of a bolder, more strident, largely Palestinian-led faction within the organization (and within the IAF itself) that borrows heavily from the motifs and strategy of Hamas. In March IAF leadership elections, Bani-Irshayd, a representative of the "Jordanian Hamas" wing of the organization was elected secretary general, the IAF's top post. While East Banker Jordanians still control a majority of the seats in the IAF, Bani-Irshayd's election represents a trend toward a growing Palestinian presence in the organization's leadership and suggests a potential "Hamasization" of the group. (David Schenker, “Hamas Weapons in Jordan: Implications for Islamists on the East Bank,” PolicyWatch #1098, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 5, 2006; emphasis added)<br /> <br />This radicalization of the IAF can be seen by the statements made by IAF leaders once again expressing the Muslim Brotherhood’s “pragmatic” views on Israel. In an interview last year with the Washington Post, Bani-Rashid, the head of the IAF, expressed his organization’s intent to revoke Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel, much like Supreme Guide Akef has threatened to do in Egypt should the Brotherhood come to power.<br /> <br />According to IAF leader Bani-Irshayd, “We are clear....We reject this treaty because it is against Jordan’s national interest. But we will move cautiously. We will ask for a referendum on it.” (Daniel Williams “Political Islam’s Opportunity in Jordan,” Washington Post, April 13, 2006)<br /> <br />Nor does the IAF express any reluctance in embracing their terrorist Palestinian brothers. That same Washington Post article later says,<br /> <br />The party sympathizes with Hamas, formally known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, which the United States and European Union have labeled a terrorist organization. "We have a special feeling for Hamas in the face of the Zionist project," Saad [Bani-Irshayd] said.<br /> <br />At this point, Leiken and Brooke will probably try to respond that the recent attempt by HAMAS to disassociate themselves with the IAF disproves my point about the Hamasization of the IAF; but to raise the issue results in some very inopportune questions for them about what the most “moderate” and most politically active Muslim Brotherhood affiliate in the Middle East was doing working in cooperation with the most violent element of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first place. I doubt that they’ll be eager to admit that that HAMAS has submitted the dispute between the two organizations to none other than Supreme Guide Mohammad Akef. Maybe things weren’t so strained after all? (Stayed tuned for how they spin this!)<br /> <br />We can also observe how this most “moderate” element of the Muslim Brotherhood still uses the threat of violence when it doesn’t get it’s way politically. After the Jordanian government instituted new measures last year to combat terrorism by targeting terrorist supporters (HAMAS) in response to the 11/9 bombings, IAF leader Bani-Rashid hinted that such a move would have violent repercussions, saying that the “continuation of repression of people’s choices (HAMAS – ed) will lead to atmospheres where extremism can thrive replacing the moderate Islamic groups.” (United Press International, “Jordan Enacts New Anti-Terror Law,” [May 29, 2006])<br /> <br />And yet, IAF leader Bani-Rashid is the exact same individual that Leiken and Brooke quote in their Foreign Affairs article as carrying the banner of anti-jihad:<br /> <br />The leader of the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Muslim Brotherhood’s political party in Jordan, said that his group outdoes the government in discouraging jihad: “We’re better able to conduct an intellectual confrontation, and not a security confrontation, with the forces of extremism and fanaticism.” (“The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, p. 112)<br /> <br />On that same day that the IAF chief was threatening violence, a report in the Jordanian daily Al Rai described how IAF deputy Mohammad Abu Fares and a gang of IAF thugs assaulted an imam at a mosque located in a refugee camp in Irbid in an unsuccessful attempt to seize the podium and deliver the Friday sermon. This is the same IAF deputy that was one of the four MPs who visited Zarqawi’s family, and after taking criticisms from family members of those killed in the 11/9 bombings, said in reply, “We (Muslim Brotherhood) are not in a place to pass judgment onto other people categorizing who is a believer and who is not.” But in his Friday sermon that week (no imam assault involved on that occasion), he praised Zarqawi as a mujahid. Apparently they were in a place to pass judgment.<br /> <br />The Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, Jihad, and Al-Qaeda<br /> <br />Another example identified by some advocates of a “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood is the chapter in Kuwait, where the political wing of the Brotherhood, the Islamic Constitutional Movement, represents the largest parliamentary bloc (see Nathan Brown, “Pushing toward Party Politics? Kuwait’s Islamic Constitutional Movement,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegie Paper No. 79 [January 2007]).<br /> <br />The Kuwaiti branch broke away from the larger Brotherhood organization in 1991 as a result of the international organization’s stand against the Gulf War, but relations have steadily improved and the Kuwaiti branch resumed attending international Brotherhood events several years ago (see Wendy Kristianasen, “Kuwaiti’s Islamists, Officially Unofficial,” Le Monde Diplomatique [June 2002]).<br /> <br />And yet while Muslim Brotherhood backers in the West hail the alleged democratic achievements and intents of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, it is perhaps one of the most radical for preaching jihad, advocating for the imposition of shari’a, and financing terrorism. When Kuwaiti authorities decided to crackdown on jihadist activity, there was only place to start – the Muslim Brotherhood – as Stephen Ulph of the Jamestown Foundation explained:<br /> <br />Against this backdrop of accelerated jihadist activity, Kuwaiti authorities conducted an investigation into mosque preachers suspected of disseminating hard-line jihadist ideology. Although the investigation also embraced preachers of the Shi'ite denomination, most of the twelve or so under investigation were Sunni clerics of Egyptian nationality, who predominate Kuwaiti mosques. A significant portion of these have ties with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood which, while advertising its interest in participation within Egypt's political system, is less reticent about calling for radical solutions abroad. (Stephen Ulph, “Kuwait Steps up Anti-jihad Activities,” Terrorism Focus 1:3 [September 03, 2004], emphasis added)<br /> <br />The Brotherhood’s aggressive cultural campaign to impose shari’a on Kuwaiti society is best exhibited by their continual efforts to amend Article 2 of the country’s constitution to shift the language from saying that shari’a is “a main source of legislation” to shari’a is “the source of legislation”.<br /> <br />For an organization that is acclaimed by the Beltway intelligentsia in the US as an advocate of women’s rights, the Brotherhood has been the leading advocate of the continued segregation of women from society. It should also be noted that in 2001 the head of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, Abdullah al-Mutawa, famously predicted the “wrath of Allah” would fall upon the whole of Kuwaiti society due to a women’s soccer match and the broadcasting of women’s sports events during the Sydney Olympics.<br /> <br />As the Bush Administration and US counterterrorism officials responded to 9/11 by going after al-Qaeda’s network of financial support, they observed a common thread stretching from the Gulf States, Europe, to the US, all tied to al-Qaeda – the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood. As the US campaign against al-Qaeda’s financial networks intensified, one of the first stops in the Middle East for then-US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill was Kuwait.<br /> <br />Former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke offered testimony before the Senate Banking Committee in October 2003, where he identified multiple points of contact between the Kuwaiti Brotherhood and the highest levels of al-Qaeda.<br /> <br />· The Kuwaiti government allegedly provides substantial funding to charities controlled by the Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood, such as Lajnat al-Dawa. The U.S. Department of Treasury and the United Nations Security Council designated Lajnat al-Dawa on January 9, 2003 as a supporter of al-Qaeda. Lajnat al-Dawa and its affiliates had offices in the U.S. in Michigan, Colorado and Northern Virginia. (p. 6)<br />· The Kuwait Finance House was allegedly an investor in BMI. The Kuwait Finance House is reported to be the financial arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait. Several al-Qaeda operatives have allegedly been associated with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Suliman abu Ghaith, Wadih el Hage and Ramsi Yousef. On January 9, 2003, the Treasury Department designated the Kuwaiti Lajnat al-Dawa as a terrorist entity. Lajnat al-Dawa reportedly spawned out of and is controlled by the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood. (p. 11)<br />· Tareq Suwaidan, a leading member of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, reportedly engaged in financial transactions with BMI. (ibid.)<br /> <br />In 2003, some Kuwaiti Brotherhood members went one step beyond preaching jihad and financing terrorism to form their own military wing – the Kuwaiti HAMAS Movement. Drawing explicitly from Muslim Brotherhood clerics, they expressed their intent to target American “invaders” and “crusaders”, though they weren’t near as concerned about American “crusaders” when America led the effort to free Kuwait in the Gulf War.<br /> <br />In analyzing the charter for Kuwaiti HAMAS, Islamist expert Reuven Paz noted three important themes:<br /> <br />The language, terms used, and the forum in which this declaration was placed clearly indicate the work of the Muslim Brotherhood and not any other radical group affiliated with Qa`idat al-Jihad.<br />The recent Fatwahs of Al-Azhar and the Qatar-based Egyptian Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi,(2) the main Islamic authority for the Palestinian Hamas, motivated the author or authors of this declaration. It was not necessarily motivated by the writings and declarations of bin Ladin, Qa`idat al-Jihad, or several of the Islamic scholars and clerics that are affiliated with al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia or the Gulf States.<br />In recent weeks, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, the leader of the Palestinian Hamas, and his senior aides, such as Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi, have given public interviews in which they stated that in the event of an American attack against Iraq, Hamas might attack American interests. Hamas senior official, Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahhar, declared recently: “If Iraq is attacked…all American targets will be open targets for every Muslim, Arab or Palestinian.” (Reuven Paz, “The Establishing of Hamas Kuwait,” Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) Occasional Paper Vol. 1, No. 2 [March 2003)<br />In forming Kuwaiti HAMAS, the organizers have not only drawn on ideological support from Brotherhood figures, but picked up the theme of attacking Americans from the leaders of Palestinian HAMAS. Yet again, this all puts the lie to Leiken and Brooke’s claim that HAMAS is not targeting Americans (covered in detail above with reference to last week’s attack on US troops by Iraqi HAMAS).<br /> <br />But despite the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood’s ties to al-Qaeda, in the recent Carnegie report cited above concerning the Brotherhood’s significant political role in that country, never once were the al-Qaeda ties mentioned or the extensive radical and jihadist activities of the organization – a curiously reoccurring phenomenon that seems habitual for the Beltway intelligentsia.<br /> <br />The opposition of Western policy wonks notwithstanding, at least one prominent Kuwaiti intellectual, Ahmad Al-Baghdadi, has insisted that the US should designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization:<br /> <br />"Perhaps the most puzzling thing is the U.S.'s silence regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that [this organization] supports terrorism, whether by supporting Bin Laden … or by publishing terrorist fatwa s, or by calling to destroy democracy…<br /> <br />"Does the U.S. expect this organization to become like the Turkish Justice and Development Party [the ruling party in Turkey,] and expect to have political contacts with it, assuming that it is an opportunistic party operating by the principle of 'the ends justify the means?' [Is] the U.S. expecting that the Muslim Brotherhood organization will similarly agree to maintain political contacts with the U.S.?… If the conservative right-wing in the U.S. believes this, it is mistaken, since this political organization, which [only] exploits religion, does not believed in rights, justice, or equality, nor does it believe in human rights – so how can the U.S. believe them? Is this not pure nonsense? (“Kuwaiti Intellectual: The Muslim Brotherhood Organization Should Be Put on the U.S. Terrorist List,” MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 843 [January 7, 2005])<br /> <br />I agree, Ahmad; it is pure nonsense.<br /> <br />No doubt, Leiken and Brooke will charge him too with “muddying the windshield” and making such a “childish” call by expressing his skepticism about claims of a “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood; though whether they also designate him an “armchair/internet intellectual” remains to be seen. If so, I can testify that he’ll be in good company<br /> <br />Up the Blue Nile Without a Paddle<br /> <br />“Poole’s (sic) alleges that the National Islamic Front (NIF)’s behavior in the Sudan is a good index of how the Brotherhood will rule should it come to power elsewhere. But though the NIF presents itself as the Muslim Brotherhood in the Sudan, it is a specific creature of Hasan al Turabi, who publicly and contentiously broke from the Brotherhood in the 1970s. A smaller faction remained closer to the traditional (Egyptian) Brotherhood line. This faction has considerable disagreement with al Turabi and the current policies of his government.”<br /> <br />I have a frank confession to make: I really like to watch Leiken and Brooke at work. They offer more rhetorical shakes, shimmies, twists and turns than a jive dance competition. Here we’re treated to a full floor show.<br /> <br />Notice in the quote above their claim that the NIF, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, “is a specific creature of Hasan al Turabi”. While I think that it is an exaggeration to say that the NIF is a “specific creature” of Turabi, I will readily concede that his role has been instrumental. (For the development of the Brotherhood in Sudan and Turabi’s role, see Prof. Gabriel R. Warburg, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan: From Reforms to Radicalism,” The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World; reprinted, Project for the Research of Islamist Movements (PRISM) Islam in Africa Research Project, August 2006)<br /> <br />But with respect to Turabi, we are told that he “publicly and contentiously broke from the Brotherhood in the 1970s”. This, I imagine, is an intentional attempt to put distance between Turabi and the Brotherhood to detach the latter from Turabi’s active support of al-Qaeda (he famously hosted bin Laden in Khartoum from 1991-1996) and his essential role in forging the network of global jihad through his conferences featuring virtually every Islamic terrorist organization in the Middle East, including Hezbollah and other Shi’ite organizations. Sudan has also been the primary state supporter of terrorism on the African continent, backing the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia, and playing a critical role in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.<br /> <br />And then there is the war the NIF government waged against the indigenous Christian population in the oil-rich south of the country, which claimed the lives of 2 million people, as well as the current ethnic cleansing campaign against non-Arab Muslims in Darfur directed by the government in Khartoum.<br /> <br />While Leiken and Brooke now claim in response to my earlier criticisms that Turabi broke with the Brotherhood in the 1970s, we read in their Foreign Affairs article that in the 1980s, Turabi was in their estimation “the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood powerhouse”:<br /> <br />In the early 1980s, the Egyptian Ikhwan sought to establish coordination among dozens of national offspring. But opposition was universal. Right next door, the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood powerhouse Hasan al-Turabi protested, “You cannot run the world from Cairo.” (“The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, p. 115)<br /> <br />So we can watch as Leiken and Brooke shimmy and shake regarding Turabi depending on the particular circumstance, and whether they are making a case for the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood (where Turabi is a “Muslim Brotherhood powerhouse” serving as bulwark against organizational hegemony in the 1980s), or if they are responding to critics (where they push Turabi’s connections to the Brotherhood as far back as possible). Several answers for the price of one!<br /> <br />It is true that many Muslim Brotherhood leaders in the Middle East are now openly critical of Turabi. But the reason they reject Turabi is that he is now too liberal for their tastes, particularly on his understanding of the role of women in society! Take, for instance, this condemnation last year of Turabi by one of the leaders of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood:<br /> <br />The outlawed but tolerated Muslim Brotherhood Organization also blasted Sudanese Islamic leader Hassan al-Turabi for issuing edicts allowing Muslim women to wear a less rigid veil.<br /> <br />Salem Falahat, spiritual guide of the Brotherhood, whose political wing, the Islamic Action Front, controls the biggest opposition bloc in parliament, told United Press International Wednesday, "al-Turabi is condemned for issuing edicts rejected by any Muslim ulema." (United Press International, “Jordanian Islamists Blast Gadhafi, Turabi” April 12, 2006)<br /> <br />Hasan al-Turabi represents the contradictions seemingly endemic to the Brotherhood: he now argues for the liberalization of the very shari’a proscriptions that he himself imposed as Attorney General of Sudan. And while now he is vilified by Muslim Brotherhood clerics as a liberal, not long ago he was a shining example for Muslim Brotherhood leaders everywhere about what could be achieved if they could attain power and impose their Islamist agenda.<br /> <br />And while Turabi’s NIF/Muslim Brotherhood regime was committing genocide in the South, no word of protest was uttered by Brotherhood leaders – a policy that continues today with their genocide in Darfur in the East. Douglas Farah recently noted this deafening silence:<br /> <br />It is striking that the Brotherhood-related groups across Europe and the United States, and the regimes in the Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia) that support them have raised not a single protest over the genocide in Darfur. They have raised hundreds of millions of dollars to build their infrastructure and rally to the cause of Hamas and occasionally Hezbollah. But not one word of condemnation for their regime in Sudan.<br /> <br />Al Turabi opened his country to bin Laden and any other Muslim, precisely because he was implementing the Ikhwan strategy of creating a non-territorial Islamic state that welcomes all Muslims (including crossing the Shia-Sunni divide, and Youssef Nada has made clear in his public statements and the Brotherhood ties to Iran, also unexplored and unexplained in the Leiken/Brooke piece). (“As Sudan Crisis Lingers, it is Worth Recalling it is a Brotherhood Government,” [March 27, 2007])<br /> <br />And when Turabi played host to terrorists from all over the Middle East in the 1990s during his conferences in Khartoum, representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood were right there in the mix (see Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War on America [Prima, 2001], p. 103).<br /> <br />Leiken and Brooke take umbrage at my raising the issue of Sudan as an example of what a Muslim Brotherhood government might look like in Egypt, cautioning us not to look at the organization monolithically and attempting to distance the Egyptian organization for its Sudanese counterpart. But in fact, we have two examples of working Muslim Brotherhood governments – Sudan and the Palestinian Authority – and we would be derelict as analysts if these examples were left unexamined and off limits.<br /> <br />Upon inspection of the 2004 Reform Initiative, the Islamist governance program offered by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood varies little from the actual practice of the government in Khartoum.<br /> <br />At this point, Leiken and Brooke are certain to remind us with respect to the Egyptian organization:<br /> <br />“…its road to power is not revolutionary; it depends on winning the hearts through gradual and peaceful Islamization” (“The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood”, p. 111)<br /> <br />But in both cases each organization attempted to ride revolutionary coups to power – in Egypt under Nasser, and in Sudan under Bashir; in the first instance, the Brotherhood turned on the revolutionary regime because it was not implementing their hoped-for Islamist agenda fast enough, and the coup they tried to ride to power ended up turning on them; in the second case, the Brotherhood was able to implement its social and political programs, with Turabi appointed as Speaker of Parliament – the second highest political position – in 1996 (though Turabi fell out with Bashir in a power struggle in 1999, and was eventually implicated in another coup in March 2004 and arrested; he was released in June 2005).<br /> <br />We should also remember that the Egyptian and Sudanese coups are not the only examples of revolutionary behavior by the Brotherhood:<br /> <br />In some nations – Egypt, Algeria, Syria, Sudan – the Brotherhood has fomented Islamic revolution. In the Palestinian territories, the Brotherhood created the Islamic Resistance Movement, or HAMAS, which has become known for its suicide bombings of Israelis. (John Mintz and Douglas Farah, “In Search of Friends among the Foes,” Washington Post [September 11, 2004], p. A1)<br /> <br />Does this mean that the Egyptians will try once again to use revolutionary means to obtain power? Certainly not. But we would be derelict in our analysis if we refused to consider that the Brotherhood has an organizational history in several countries – including Egypt – of utilizing revolutionary coups.<br /> <br />On the other hand, we also have an example last year of HAMAS coming to power through evolutionary means (elections), but it is important to note that they took control of the government there without renouncing their campaign of terrorist violence to any degree; in fact, we’ve seen almost constant violence between HAMAS and Fatah struggling for power since the elections.<br /> <br />Why is this important? In the two existing examples of Brotherhood affiliates coming to power, violence was and remains a component of both, though one was accomplished by a coup, and the other through elections. Both were cheered by the Brotherhood internationally, notwithstanding their sometimes public statements disavowing violence by Brotherhood leaders. They see no contradiction between these positions, because the use of violence is merely a question of tactics, not strategy. In the statements by their leaders and by their organization’s actions, we discover that achieving power to implement the Brotherhood’s program of Islamization is to be accomplished (pace Malcolm X) by any means necessary.<br /> <br />One expert has noted that when considering their program of Islamization, whether accomplished through violent or non-violent means, the end result is inevitably anti-democratic:<br /> <br />Recently, much has been made of the differences between violent and nonviolent Islamist groups. The implication is that, by renouncing violence, a group essentially punches its entry ticket into the democratic game. Yet, one must keep in mind three important facts. First, Islamists view violence as a tactic, not a strategy. The Islamist strategy is unchanging: the transformation of existing regimes into sharia-based states. Some groups use revolutionary means (i.e., violence) to achieve this revolutionary end, while others use evolutionary means (i.e., elections). The end is always the same, though—and always antidemocratic.<br /> <br />Second, no Islamist group has ever suspended violence except when pressured by a regime. In Algeria, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and elsewhere, Islamists eschew violence only when they have exhausted or been denied all alternatives to doing so. They have shown no evidence of a deep and long-lasting commitment to democratic politics.<br /> <br />Third, nonviolence is not the only commonly used test for inclusion in democratic politics; racism and ethnic incitement are widely used as well. For example, racist parties are banned in many European countries, and the literature and rhetoric of Islamist parties is often no less racist than that of these proscribed groups. (Robert Satloff, “U.S. Policy towards Islamists: Engagement versus Isolation,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 24, 2005)<br /> <br />In terms of US policy, that the Muslim Brotherhood at times uses evolutionary means, rather than revolutionary, is not an accurate measure of determining their “moderation” when their stated ultimate goal of Islamization is considered. If evolutionary/revolutionary means was our ultimate guide, as Leiken and Brooke urge us, we would have to conclude (as Robert Satloff has hinted at above) that if the German Nazi Party had used elections to seize Austria, the Rhineland, the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia, and half of Poland in the 1930s, US foreign policy should have recognized the Nazis as a “moderate” force of change in Europe.<br /> <br />Leiken and Brooke will no doubt protest at applying their logic in this manner, but the comparison between Nazism and all of it attendant horrors, and Islamism, as practiced in Sudan, Iran and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and advanced by the Muslim Brotherhood all over the world, including the West, fits perfectly.<br /> <br />Whether it is achieving power through coups, such as in Sudan; or through elections, like HAMAS in the Palestinian Authority (though still engaging in terrorism); or the parliamentary participation of Brotherhood affiliates in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait, they all adhere to the same inherently anti-democratic program of Islamization. There is no “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood to be found.Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-34420269612253258862008-07-10T22:00:00.000-07:002008-07-10T22:01:12.320-07:00Showdown on the Muslim BrotherhoodBy Patrick Poole, Frontpage Magazine<br />FrontPageMagazine.com | Monday, April 16, 2007<br />I must admit that I was pleased last week when FrontPage Magazine’s editors informed me that they were about to publish a response by Robert Leiken and Steven Brooke of the Nixon Center to my article last month, “Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood.” Before having had a chance to read their “Response to Patrick Poole’s ‘Mainstreaming the Muslim Brotherhood,’” I sincerely hoped that we might have the makings of an open and serious public policy debate.<br />I will admit that there are elements to their original article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” that are sound, reasonable and uncontroversial, such as their recommendation that the U.S. must approach and consider each Brotherhood chapter in their respective countries as entities in their own right, rather than trying to consider the vast movement as a monolithic whole; and engaging reformists of all types in the Middle East. Who could possibly disagree? At other times in their original article they rely on making obvious statements of fact, such as that within the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood there are varying sentiments, programs and ideas, and the organization is not a monolith. O.K., no problem here.<br /> <br />But at the very points of controversy and dispute at issue, Leiken and Brooke make a wide variety of unsupported and circular claims that are central to their overall argument. The lynchpin of their thesis, that the Muslim Brotherhood has “rejected global jihad” and is “embracing democracy,” is simply asserted and assumed throughout their Foreign Affairs article, and those two points were the focus of my previous criticism. The only support they offer are quotes from several unnamed Brotherhood operatives, and the authors’ assurances that since they have traveled to and met with “reformist” Brotherhood leaders in several countries, they are in a unique position to make these otherwise unsupported claims. Their Foreign Affairs article offers neither footnotes nor citations to the work of other scholars in support of their position (and they barely offered a handful in their most recent missive). And as I noted in my original critique, in baldly asserting these positions, they either intentionally ignore or outright misrepresent evidence familiar to most researchers that fundamentally contradicts the very points they are advancing.<br /> <br />I hoped when I heard that they had offered a response to my critique that finally we could engage in a substantive debate over the issues I raised. But when I and FrontPage Magazine readers finally had the opportunity to read their response last Wednesday, those hopes of having an open and substantive debate were quickly crushed.<br /> <br />Once again, Leiken and Brooke rely on evasion, duplicity and outright lies (I’ll discuss one glaring example of this latter tactic in relation to statements they made regarding the Brotherhood’s Jordanian affiliate) – methods not dissimilar to those used by the Muslim Brotherhood itself – to avoid answering the hard questions posed not just by myself, but by analysts from all across the political spectrum, about the organization’s deep and long-time connections to terrorism, their supposed disavowal of violence, and the genuineness of their claims to be favorably inclined towards democratic activity.<br /> <br />When those tactics weren’t sufficient to argue their case, ad hominem attacks, rhetorical gimmicks and appeals to their vastly superior intellect and professional experience as Beltway insiders were used to fill in the gaps. As Douglas Farah has noted, these are precisely the same bush-league tactics Leiken and Brooke used just a few weeks ago in their Center’s publication, In The National Interest, (“Strategic Thinking about the Muslim Brotherhood”) to falsely smear another critic, Yousef Ibrahim, who raised many of the same concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood in an op-ed in the NY Sun that took issue with their Foreign Affairs article. Confronted with the facts by Farah and others, Leiken and Brooke were forced to half-heartedly retract their smear against Ibrahim.<br /> <br />But they tried to throw some of that same mud on me. This is just one example.<br /> <br />Poole wants us to think that the government was suppressing only Muslim extremists. This would come as a surprise to the activists, journalists, bloggers, and everyday citizens who have been arrested, beaten, tortured, and generally intimidated for supporting the very same political reforms endorsed by the Muslim Brotherhood.<br /> <br />What Leiken and Brooke attempt to do here is to manufacture an absurdly ridiculous position and impute it to me to characterize me as either: 1) slightly to the right of Attila the Hun; 2) a wanna-be “internet intellectual” without the slightest clue of what I’m talking about (a theme they pick up later); 3) a certifiable loon; or 4) all the above.<br /> <br />Anyone familiar with the art of rhetoric will readily identify the sleight-of-hand gimmick being used here – the “straw man” argument. It would be much like them telling you my favorite pastimes are drowning kittens and tossing cuddly Labrador puppies into a wood chipper. You get the point.<br /> <br />But just to make it clear, this is something that they have entirely invented themselves (see entry: “making sh-t up”) in an attempt to discredit me without bothering to take issue with something I actually have said or written. In the nearly 20 years of my professional life, I cannot recall ever speaking or writing a single kind word in favor of the Mubarak regime. Nonetheless, they have uncovered my secret motives to make you believe that Mubarak is only suppressing extremists (like the “moderate” Muslim Brotherhood)!<br /> <br />Again, this is not the first time that they have been caught “making sh-t up” about their critics in recent weeks (will I also be afforded a public retraction?). And yet we’re supposed to take them entirely at their word that the Muslim Brotherhood has “rejected global jihad” and “embraces democracy.”<br /> <br />Before getting into my detailed rejoinder to their response, let me qualify that in debating the issue over how the United States deals with the Muslim Brotherhood, reasonable, informed and well-intentioned people can disagree. This is precisely the point at which open and substantive debate should be encouraged, and FrontPage Magazine should be given kudos for opening their electronic space to different sides of the issue. But since Leiken and Brooke have resorted to running from an honest debate, I feel an obligation to provide some correction to their dissembling.<br /> <br />One of the first claims they make in their response to my article is that “we will answer all of Poole’s arguments, notwithstanding that he evaded all of ours.” But in fact, two of the central claims of my original critique receive not a single word of mention from Leiken and Brooke in their response:<br /> <br />1) the analysis I gave of the Brotherhood’s 2004 “Reform Initiative” as a counter-example of the group’s “embrace” of democracy (see also, Dr. Sayed Mahmoud Al-Qumni, “The Muslim Brotherhood’s Initiative as a Reform Program,” Brookings Institution paper delivered at the Conference on Islamic Reform [Oct. 5-6, 2004]); and<br />2) the use of the Brotherhood’s extensive international banking network to support virtually every Islamic terrorist organization in the world, including Al-Qaeda (see Michael Isikoff and Mark Hosenball, “Terror Watch: How Osama bin Laden Finances Terror,” Newsweek [May 24, 2004] and Douglas Farah, “The Little Explored Offshore Empire of the International Muslim Brotherhood,” International Assessment and Strategy Center [April 18, 2006] and Khaled Dawoud, “Brotherhood faces WTC Fallout,” Al-Ahram Weekly No. 560 [November 15-21, 2001])<br /> <br />This omission is no surprise, of course, as the evidence against their position is simply overwhelming and not really a matter of dispute amongst scholars; I assume that this is why they thought it best to evade these topics altogether.<br /> <br />With that introduction, let’s look at their response to me in detail.<br /> <br />“Rejecting Global Jihad” – A Distinction without a Difference<br /> <br />1) “Poole states that we claim the Brotherhood “rejects jihad.” But this phrase appears nowhere in our article. Instead, we asserted that that all factions of the Muslim Brotherhood “reject global jihad.” We used the term for a reason.”<br /> <br />The first claim is fairly easy to deal with. As I noted in my original article, the phrases “rejecting jihad” and “embracing democracy” are taken straight from their article’s own summary statement:<br /> <br />Even as Western commentators condemn the Muslim Brotherhood for its Islamism, radicals in the Middle East condemn it for rejecting jihad and embracing democracy. Such relative moderation offers Washington a notable opportunity for engagement – as long as policymakers recognize the considerable variation between the group's different branches and tendencies. (Emphasis added.)<br /> <br />Apparently the distinction they are trying to draw between “rejecting jihad” and “rejecting global jihad” was just as lost on their editors at the Council on Foreign Relations as it was to me and other readers. But now they have cleared the matter up for us. They explain:<br /> <br />Global jihad is Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri’s unconditional violence against a broad range of targets: “Jews and Crusaders,” America and its allies, Great Britain, Israel, Spain, Turkey, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco and even Saudi Arabia. This cannot be demagogically equated with the Brotherhood notion of defensive jihad.<br /> <br />They want us to conclude that blowing up Jewish schoolchildren in Israel and killing American soldiers in Iraq is not part of al-Qaeda’s “global jihad” against “Jews and Crusaders,” but rather, part of the Brotherhood’s “defensive jihad,” notwithstanding that Jewish schoolchildren are precisely the “Jews” and American soldiers are the “Crusaders” al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood both have in mind!<br /> <br />As one of the “demagogues” they are trying correct, I readily admit that I understand the jihadist concept of “near enemy” and “far enemy” (see Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks [2004, University of Pennsylvania Press]), as well as the amorphous Islamic doctrine of “defensive jihad” (see David Cook, Understanding Jihad [2005, University of California Press]). The simple fact of the matter is, however, that within the context of the Muslim Brotherhood, “global jihad” and “defensive jihad” in the real world of the Middle East all involve terrorism directed at innocent civilians, such as the “defensive jihad” terrorist activities of the Brotherhood’s Palestinian chapter, HAMAS, which are actively supported by the whole of the Muslim Brotherhood movement internationally (more on HAMAS later).<br /> <br />By relying on the phrase “rejecting global jihad,” Leiken and Brooke are trying to draw a distinction without a difference. It’s all terrorism, and the fact that they are willing to admit that the Brotherhood tactically shies away from one but not the other is an admission that the Brotherhood has refused to disavow the use of violence and withdraw their financial, operational and rhetorical support for terrorist activities, which is expressly the point at issue. No amount of demagogic nuance that the pair want try offer should distract us from that cold, hard fact.<br /> <br />As I mentioned in my first article, that the Muslim Brotherhood still embraces violence as part of the political and cultural program is precisely the bone of contention for those in the West skeptical of the group’s intentions. So, if they haven’t renounced violence, on what basis are Leiken and Brooke trying to paint the Brotherhood as “moderate”? Honestly, I still don’t know. And in the U.S., that concern about the Brotherhood’s acceptance of violence is bipartisan. I previously noted that President Clinton’s Special Envoy to the Middle East, Dennis Ross, recently expressed his doubts about the Brotherhood’s rejection of violence:<br /> <br />He (Ross – ed.) added that he would not talk to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and that despite its assertion that it wants to engage in the political process in Egypt, the movement supports the use of violence in other areas and this is the main problem. He firmly stated that as long as the movement supported violence as a means to achieve political objectives, then dialogue could not be established with such an organization. (Manal Lufti, “The Brotherhood and America, Part Three,” Asharq Al-Awsat [03/14/07])<br /> <br />Apparently, Ross didn’t get Leiken and Brooke’s memo. But this esteemed American diplomat’s assessment raises a more fundamental issue: U.S. foreign policy has always been that we will not deal with terrorism or its supporters. That position was resoundingly and forcefully restated in the days after 9/11 by Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and “Progressives,” alike.<br /> <br />But to buy into the “terrorism as defensive jihad” approach advocated by Leiken and Brooke, and to look the other way as the Brotherhood heartily endorses HAMAS suicide bombings and Hezbollah’s indiscriminate rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, this would be a fundamental reversal of this long-held foreign policy non-negotiable. Is this really the road that we as Americans want to go down?<br /> <br />Nonetheless, I am anxious to hear more from Leiken and Brooke about how the admitted Brotherhood’s support for terrorism in the name of “defensive jihad” clarifies their “moderate Muslim Brotherhood” thesis.<br /> <br />2) “In fact, the Brotherhood began to reject the theological underpinnings of global jihad in the 1960s, with the publication of the volume Preachers, not Judges. This work aimed to combat the theories of Sayyid Qutb, the group’s most prominent intellectual.”<br /> <br />In both their Foreign Affairs article and their recent responses directed at their critics, Leiken and Brooke have made much about the late Supreme Guide Hasan al-Hudaybi’s Preachers, Not Judges as representing the post-Qutb world of the Muslim Brotherhood that has continued up until today. In the Foreign Affairs article they write:<br /> <br />But from his own cell, Hudaybi disputed Qutb’s conclusion. Only God, he believed, could judge faith. He rejected takfir (the act of declaring another Muslim an apostate), arguing that “whoever judges that someone is no longer a Muslim ... deviates from Islam and transgresses God’s will by judging another person’s faith.” Within the Brotherhood, Hudaybi’s tolerant view—in line with Banna’s founding vision—prevailed, cementing the group’s moderate vocation. (p. 110)<br /> <br />This is where we see the realm of half-truths come into play in Leiken and Brooke’s analysis. It is true that Hudaybi wrote Preachers, Not Judges in critique of some of the jihadist doctrines picked up by Sayyid Qutb, though the book was explicitly directed at Mawdudi’s “The Four Technical Terms of the Koran,” rather than at Qutb (who Leiken and Brooke have to grudgingly acknowledge is nowhere mentioned in Hudaybi’s book, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” p. 113).<br /> <br />But as Paul Harvey would say, “and now for the rest of the story…”<br /> <br />In fact, when Qutb’s seminal work outlining his jihadist doctrine, Signposts (also known as Milestones along the Road), was first published, Hudaybi enthusiastically received the volume and its jihadist program. The French Islamic scholar, Gilles Kepel, describes his excitement:<br /> <br />Hudaybi himself (whose opinion became far more measured after 1966) declared that the book vindicated all the hopes he had placed in Sayyid Qutb, who now embodied “the future of the Muslim mission” (da’wa). (Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and the Pharaoh [1993, University of California Press], p. 30)<br /> <br />Prior to being thrown back in jail, Qubt’s extremist program was warmly embraced by the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide, who thought that it ideologically represented the future of the organization. Things apparently changed with the 1965 crackdown by Nasser.<br /> <br />Hudaybi’s critical comments could be attributed to feelings of “buyer’s remorse.” Leiken and Brooke admit that his book was written from a prison cell following the wave of arrests by Nasser in 1965 that would cost Qutb his life the following year. Hudaybi was certain to remember that his life had been spared in 1954 after a member of the Brotherhood’s “special apparatus” made an assassination attempt on Nasser – an event that occurred on Hudaybi’s watch as Supreme Guide. It was only due to Hudaybi’s advanced age that his life was spared on that occasion (a number of Brotherhood leaders were executed). It is certainly understandable that Hudaybi abandoned his friend and colleague facing the executioner once again, but in light of his previous enthusiastic endorsement of Qutb’s ideas, it isn’t unreasonable to conclude that he did so more for pragmatic (like saving his skin) than principled reasons. Thus, in many respects, Hudaybi’s rejection of violence may be a reflection of the same reasons why the Brotherhood occasionally publicly rejects the use of violence today – not out of any ideological scruples, but for fear of being put out of business by the Egyptian regime.<br /> <br />That speculation aside, it is a fair question to ask: “Exactly how far did Hudaybi’s critique penetrate the Brotherhood and the Islamist movements in general?”<br /> <br />One objective measure we can consider is that Preachers, Not Judges has not been reprinted in Egypt since 1977 (the last edition I could locate through OCLC), nor from my survey has it been reprinted anywhere else in the Middle East since 1985, when a new edition came out in Kuwait. Conversely, Qutb’s Signposts is probably the top selling Arabic-language book of the past half-century.<br /> <br />It does seem truly odd that for a book whose ideas Leiken and Brooke contend are so controlling to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood movement today (Hudaybi) and critical to understanding the organization’s alleged rejection of Qutb’s program of violent jihad has been out of print in Egypt for a full three decades, while Qutb’s Signposts remains a staple in the Brotherhood’s membership training curriculum all over the world, including the required reading list of the U.S. branch of the Brotherhood, the Muslim American Society (though Hudaybi’s book is nowhere to be found on those same lists). Perhaps Leiken and Brooke can elaborate on that.<br /> <br />It also must be considered that a wide range of books have appeared from Brotherhood leaders in more recent decades, some of which advocate the very positions that Hudaybi rejected (Saeed Hawwa’s The Muslim Brotherhood: Objective, Stages, Method comes immediately to mind, as does virtually anything by Yousef al-Qaradawi). Yes, it’s true that there is a wide range of opinion with respect to Qutb’s views; and yes, Hudaybi nominally critiqued Qutb in Preachers, Not Judges; and yes, the leaders of the Brotherhood took up Hudaybi’s criticism in an attempt to control the younger, more radical elements that had developed both internal and external to the Brotherhood. But is that book anywhere representative of the views of the Brotherhood today? Leiken and Brooke offer no evidence whatsoever to support that position beyond their own testimony. And the circumstantial evidence seems to weigh heavily against it.<br /> <br />(For a good summary of the development of Qutb’s ideology after his death, see Olivier Carré, “From Banna to Qutb and ‘Qutbism’: The Radicalization of Fundamentalist Thought under Three Regimes,” Egypt from Monarchy to Republic: A Reassessment of Revolution and Change, Shimon Shamir, ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995): 181-194)<br /> <br />3) “In Foreign Affairs we did not ignore the violent residue in the Brotherhood. We wrote ‘the Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories occupied by a foreign power. As in Afghanistan under the Soviets, the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraq and against Israel as ‘defensive jihad’ against invaders, the Muslim functional equivalent of the Christian doctrine of ‘just war.’”<br /> <br />Here we are offered a classic example of rhetorical “bait-and-switch.” Nothing in the historic Christian doctrine of “just war” compares to the justification of terrorism that is part-and-parcel of the Brotherhood’s current interpretation of and apology for “defensive jihad,” e.g. HAMAS.<br /> <br />Another recent critic of Leiken and Brooke makes the same point about their equivocation here:<br /> <br />If I am unconvinced of the Brotherhood’s democratic convictions, what of Leiken and Brooke’s claim that it represents the antithesis of jihadism? They concede some nuance: “The Brotherhood does authorize jihad in countries and territories occupied by a foreign power. Like in Afghanistan under the Soviets, the Ikhwan views the struggles in Iraq and against Israel as ‘defensive jihad’ against invaders, the Muslim functional equivalent of the Christian doctrine of ‘just war.’”<br /> <br />This is rather like saying that the acts of Jack the Ripper were the “functional equivalent” of courtly love. Just-war doctrine insists above all that war be conducted with discrimination between civilians and combatants. The Brotherhood, by contrast, cheers on suicide bombings, and some of its branches perpetrate them. (Hamas, for example, is the group’s Palestinian wing.) (Joshua Muravchik, “The Brotherhood’s Creed” Contentions [April 9, 2007])<br /> <br />With such shameless attempts at moral equivalency, it makes it very difficult to engage in civilized debate. There just isn’t much room for adult discussion if Leiken and Brooke want to contend that Islamic terrorism, whether done in the name of “defensive jihad” or “global jihad,” is on par with Christian “just war” doctrine.<br /> <br />4) “We abhor the Brotherhood’s stance on Israel and quarrel with them over other specific policies. But they oppose Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and global jihad. We hold that this difference is significant enough to make the Muslim Brotherhood collocutors and specifically indicated the U.S. should begin a dialogue “with representatives of the Brotherhood’s reformist wing, especially those already living in the West.”<br /> <br />In their Foreign Affairs article, Leiken and Brooke go to great lengths to play up the historic differences between Al-Qaeda No. 2 Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the Brotherhood to reverse engineer a position that Zawahiri’s criticism is proof that the Brotherhood is “moderate.” Comments by the pair, such as “jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood,” “these jihadists view the Brotherhood’s embrace of democracy as blasphemy,” “the acrimony between Hamas and Al-Qaeda,” and (my favorite) “the sustained fury with which the jihadists criticize Hamas” are all intended to convey the impression that the groups are deadlocked in intractable ideological warfare. Nothing could be further from the truth.<br /> <br />Admittedly, though Zawahiri was brought up through the Brotherhood’s ranks and his contacts with Osama bin Laden began when the Brotherhood sent him as a doctor to Afghanistan in the 1980s (on this point, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 [Knopf, 2006], p. 44), bin Laden’s right-hand man has been fairly critical of the Brotherhood for years.<br /> <br />But contrary to Leiken and Brooke’s representations, Zawahiri’s vocal criticism seems to be almost singular among the ranks of the jihadists. In fact, Zawahiri’s recent outburst, delivered last year after the Brotherhood’s electoral gains in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, was a shock to the Brotherhood’s leadership, which they admitted caught them off guard:<br /> <br />Egypt's Moslem Brotherhood was stunned by criticism from al-Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawaheri over its participation in parliamentary elections, according to a report Saturday by Asharq al-Awsat newspaper. <br /><br />Brotherhood spokesman Essam al-Erian told the Pan Arab daily that al-Zawaheri, whose latest video tape was aired by al-Jazeera satellite channel Friday, was the only person not to view the Moslem Brotherhood's participation in December's elections positively.<br /> <br />…Al-Erian charged that al-Zawaheri's criticism put the al-Qaeda man in the ranks of the ultra-secularists, and voices in the regime and the West that attacked the Brotherhood's participation in the elections.<br /> <br />… “What's strange is that al-Zawaheri did not know about the warning from the European Union, the United States and (Israeli Premier Ariel) Sharon against Hamas in the Palestinian legislative elections,” al-Erian continued.<br /> <br />The EU said in December that it might halt its aid to the Palestinian Authority if Hamas wins the elections. 'We are waiting to see where al-Zawerhi stands,' al-Erian added. (Deutsche Press-Agentur, “Muslim Brotherhood ‘Stunned’ by al-Zawaheri Criticism” [01/07/06])<br /> <br />Even according to the Brotherhood’s own spokesman, Zawahiri stands alone amongst jihadists in his criticism. And as I will discuss later, Al-Qaeda and HAMAS are working hand-in-hand in the Palestinian Territories since the latter has come into political power, notwithstanding the “sustained fury” the Nixon Center duo say exists between the two organizations.<br /> <br />This should give us considerable pause when considering Leiken and Brooke’s grandiose statements about the supposed acrimony and bitter hatred that they allege exists between the Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda. They’re sure to argue that as the No. 2 man in the organization, he speaks for all; but when it comes to the Muslim Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide Mehdi Akef, they dismiss him as a “doddering, slightly embarrassing old uncle.” When necessary, they try to have it both ways.<br /> <br />They also fall victim to the very problem they caution others about – treating al-Qaeda as a monolith. Apart from Zawahiri’s criticism, there’s no indication that his position is nothing more than the minority report among al-Qaeda; and as I’ll discuss below, there is significant evidence documenting current active cooperation between HAMAS and al-Qaeda.<br /> <br />One noted expert, Lydia Khalil of the Jamestown Foundation and the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, offers a wiser and much more nuanced perspective that the differences between the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda are one of tactics, and not of overall strategy:<br /> <br />Despite what al-Zawahiri claims, the Muslim Brotherhood has not relinquished the goal of Islamic governance, although their methods to achieve it may have changed. Nor have the Ikhwan embraced the United States. For the Muslim Brotherhood, Islam cannot be separated from governance or political life…Although the Muslim Brotherhood has moderated its rhetoric, tactics and approach over the years, its overarching goal of Islamic governance has not wavered despite its efforts to publicly de-emphasize this fact. (Lydia Khalil, “Al-Qaeda & the Muslim Brotherhood: United by Strategy, Divided by Tactics,” Terrorism Monitor Volume 4, Issue 6 [March 23, 2006], pp. 7-8)<br /> <br />Khalil also took note of a public statement made by one of the Brotherhood’s leaders and parliamentary representatives:<br /> <br />Al-Zawahiri’s criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood’s election strategy has not compelled the Ikhwan to change tactics, but neither has it cause them to forgo sympathizing with the militant jihadist struggle coordinated by al-Qaeda… Egyptian MP and Muslim Brotherhood member Ragib Hilal Hamida has been on the record stating that he supports al-Qaeda and that the Quran condones terrorism. He clarifies his position by claiming that terrorism is not a criminal act, but rather a resistance to occupation and the influence of non-Islamic powers, which is legitimate in the eyes of the Quran.<br /> <br />“Terrorism is not a curse when given its true meaning. [When interpreted accurately] it means opposing occupation as it exists in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq…From my point of view, bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi are not terrorists in the sense accepted by some. I support all their activities since they are a thorn in the side of the Americans and the Zionists.” (Roz al-Yousef, January 28-February 3). (Khalil, “Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood,” p. 9)<br /> <br />So much for the Brotherhood “opposing Bin Laden, Zawahiri, and global jihad”!<br /> <br />Here we see that the distinction that Leiken and Brooke implore us to make between “global jihad” and “defensive jihad” is not one that at least some of the leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood are willing to accept. Perhaps they will tell us next that Hamida is a “hard-line” and “controversial figure,” much like anyone else from the Muslim Brotherhood that says or does something that doesn’t fit into their tight little “rejecting global jihad” and “embracing democracy” package.<br /> <br />Then we come to the supposed “acrimony between Hamas and al-Qaeda.” But the reality is that since the HAMAS Palestinian Authority electoral victory last year, the West Bank and Gaza have become al-Qaeda safe havens – all with the approval and assistance of HAMAS. Apparently the relations between the two are not as acrimonious as Leiken and Brooke would have us believe.<br /> <br />One definitive analysis that puts the lie to these claims of an acrimonious relationship is by Lt. Col. Jonathan Helevi. In a detailed report published in the wake of last year’s Palestinian Authority elections, “Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and Al-Qaeda Jihadism,” Halevi has a section entitled, Hamas and Al-Qaeda: Partners in Global Jihad, that is so important to the issue at hand that the section bears worth reprinting in its entirety:<br /> <br />On March 2, 2006, PA Chairman Abbas told Al-Hayat (UK) that he had received intelligence information indicating the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in the West Bank and Gaza,22 just two days after Israel publicized the arrest of two al-Qaeda operatives in Nablus. Azzam Abu al-Ads and Bilal Hafnawy were indicted for recruiting operatives to carry out terror attacks for al-Qaeda and planning a combined terror attack in Jerusalem with a suicide bomber and a car bomb. Members of the gang who were recruited by al-Qaeda's infrastructure in Irbid, Jordan, were arrested by Israeli security forces at the Allenby Bridge on December 10, 2005, when returning from Jordan.23<br /> <br />However, on March 15, 2006, Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal called Abbas' warning about an al-Qaeda infrastructure in the PA "unfortunate," adding that "we don't understand the logic behind these statements." He emphasized that "al-Qaeda has no presence on Palestinian soil."24 Yet on April 4, 2006, Al-Hayat reported "a definite presence" of al-Qaeda operatives in the Gaza Strip who had just infiltrated from several Arab countries including Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen.<br /> <br />It has been known for some time that al-Qaeda operatives are present in the Palestinian Authority. In August 2000, Israel's security service uncovered a terror network linked to al-Qaeda and headed by Nabil Okal, a Hamas operative from Gaza, who underwent military training in camps of the terrorist chieftain Osama bin Laden in Pakistan and Afghanistan during 1997-1998.25 In July 2005, al-Qaeda gangs fired Kassam rockets at the Israeli town of Neve Dekalim in Gush Katif and also disseminated a video documenting its activities.26 On October 7, 2005, the Palestinian news agency Ma'an published a declaration circulated in Khan Yunis in which al-Qaeda announced the establishment of a branch in Gaza. The declaration, signed with the name "Qaedat Aljihad in Palestine," states that the organization's main goals are: implementing Islamic law (Sharia), setting up a Sharia state, reviving the idea of the caliphate in the hearts of the Muslims, and working to create a worldwide Islamic caliphate.27<br /> <br />More recently on March 26, 2006, a senior Hamas figure, Muhammad Sayyam, met in Peshawar, Pakistan, with Sayyid Salah al-Din, leader of the Kashmiri terror organization Hezb ul-Mujahidin,28 which had training camps in Afghanistan until the Taliban's fall from power and functioned as an al-Qaeda affiliate.29 Sayyam heads the Yemeni branch of the Palestine Scholars Association, which advocates uncompromising jihad against the infidels and legally sanctioned suicide bombings against civilians in Israel. He sees the role of Muslim religious sages as spiritual guides whose task is to motivate the masses to struggle against Islam's enemies and attack them with suicide bombings.30<br /> <br />Saudi Islamist cleric Sheikh Dr. Nasser Al-'Omar hosted a reception for a Hamas delegation led by Khaled Mashaal in Riyadh on March 12, 2006, also attended by prominent clerics and Islamists, some of whom had served prison terms for their suspected support of al-Qaeda or for criticizing the Saudi government.31<br /> <br />In honor of a visit to Yemen by Khaled Mashaal on March 20, 2006, the Hamas office in Yemen organized a conference to recruit financial aid for the Hamas movement and the new Hamas government. Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani also took part in the conference, meeting with Mashaal, calling on participants to assist the Hamas regime, and setting a personal example by contributing 200,000 rials.32 Zindani stressed that "the support we can provide at present is money (emphasis added)," hinting at other forms of support for Hamas in the future.<br /> <br />On February 24, 2004, U.S. authorities had designated al-Zindani as a terror supporter, "loyal to Osama bin Laden and a supporter of the al-Qaeda organization." The U.S. Treasury Department stated: "The U.S. has credible evidence that al-Zindani, a Yemeni national, supports designated terrorists and terrorist organizations" and "has a long history of working with bin Laden, notably serving as one of his spiritual leaders." The statement said al-Zindani "support[ed] many terrorist causes, including actively recruiting for al-Qaeda training camps," and in 2004 "played a key role in the purchase of weapons on behalf of al-Qaeda and other terrorists."33<br /> <br />Relations between al-Qaeda and Hamas go back to the early 1990s. In April 1991, Sudanese leader Hasan Turabi hosted a "Popular Arab and Islamic Conference" in Khartoum that brought together for the first time Islamists from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. In addition to Hamas, Osama bin Laden also attended and in subsequent years turned Sudan into his main base of operations. Turabi continued to host this jihadist gathering in 1993 and 1995; Hamas training camps in Sudan existed alongside those of al-Qaeda. Their solidarity could be inferred from bin Laden's explicit reference to Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin as one of the five ulema on which bin Laden based his August 1996 Declaration of Jihad Against the U.S.34<br /> <br />As noted in the case of al-Zindani, al-Qaeda and Hamas have long shared global funding mechanisms. On October 22, 2003, Richard A. Clarke, the former National Counterterrorism Coordinator on the U.S. National Security Council, acknowledged that Hamas and al-Qaeda had a common financial infrastructure: "the funding mechanisms for PIJ [Palestinian Islamic Jihad] and Hamas appear also to have been funding al-Qaeda."35<br /> <br />Even though Hamas and al-Qaeda share a similar worldview that seeks to impose worldwide Islamic rule, recently disagreements have erupted between the two organizations over how to implement the Islamic revolution. In a taped missive on March 5, 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy, called on Hamas to continue its armed struggle and reject agreements signed between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Al-Zawahiri emphasized that "no Palestinian has the right to give up even a grain of Palestinian land," and warned Hamas against "the new American game that is called a political process," alluding to democratization. Khaled Mashaal responded by saying that Hamas did not need advice from al-Qaeda, and will continue to act in keeping with its worldview and the Palestinian interest.36<br /> <br />Mashaal's reaction indicates a difference between Hamas' agenda and al-Qaeda's. Al-Qaeda totally rejects any element of Western influence and sees terror as the most effective means to overthrow the infidel regimes, spread Islam, and establish Islamic rule. Hamas, however, is prepared to make a pretense of going along with the Western democratic rules of the game and thereby exploit them to remove the infidel regimes, propagate Islam, and install Islamic rule that will eliminate democracy. Yet, in substance, Hamas has not rejected the heart of al-Zawahiri's advice: it still refuses to give up armed struggle or recognize past Israeli-Palestinian agreements, and it steadfastly refuses to state that it is prepared to make peace with Israel. In other words, Hamas is prepared to adopt a pragmatic tactic that does not violate its basic principles as a means of realizing its ultimate long-term goals, which are no different from al-Qaeda's. (Lt. Col. Jonathan D. Halevi, “Understanding the Direction of the New Hamas Government: Between Tactical Pragmatism and Al-Qaeda Jihadism,” Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Policy, Jerusalem Issue Brief No. 542 [May 1, 2006]; footnotes are in the original and can be accessed by following the link to the article)<br /> <br />I anticipate that Leiken and Brooke will have the chutzpah to tell us that Halevi is actually making their point about the difference between “defensive jihad” and “global jihad,” but in fact, Halevi clearly demonstrates that if there is any difference, it is because they are operating in different stages of the same global jihad, not that the Brotherhood has renounced violence to any degree. The evidence provided in this report also directly challenges that the Brotherhood and HAMAS has “rejected global jihad” – the crux of Leiken and Brooke’s thesis. Halevi’s documentation also eviscerates their claim that there is a root of eternal hatred between HAMAS and al-Qaeda, and the rest of his report is also instructive on how the larger Muslim Brotherhood organization fits into this cozy global jihadist love triangle.<br /> <br />But if all else fails, they will always have “Crazy Uncle Ayman” to appeal to!Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-64128875770024482362008-07-10T21:56:00.000-07:002008-07-11T18:46:30.751-07:00JihadBy Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood with the peface by Dr A. M. A. Fahmy<br /><br />Preface<br /> In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful. Praise be to Allah, and may his peace and blessings be upon Muhammad and upon his household and companions, and all those who follow him.<br /><br />The Muslim world today is faced with tyranny and injustice. Indeed oppression and hardship is not just limited to the Muslim world, rather many non-Muslim states are subject to oppression at the hands of the world’s leading military and economic powers. Anyone who cares can only be saddened and hurt by the pain and suffering that accompanies so many faces. Islam has allowed jihad as a means to prevent oppression, yet the Muslims have forgotten this for too long.<br /><br />Though jihad may be a part of the answer to the problems of the ummah, it is an extremely important part. Jihad is to offer ourselves to Allah for His Cause. Indeed, every person should according to Islam prepare himself/herself for jihad and every person should eagerly and patiently wait for the day when Allah will call them to show their willingness to sacrifice their lives. We should all ask ourselves if there is a quicker way to heaven? It is with this in mind that this booklet is being published.<br /><br />It may be asked of ourselves and others here as to why we remain in this country while there is so much opportunity for reward. It is our understanding that today’s problems does not require the one solution whether this be jihad, working for the khilafah, purifying ourselves etc. but rather our situation today requires action on all fronts. Everybody has a role to play in today’s great jigsaw, those who are attempting to establish the Islamic state have to continue doing so focusing their minds onto such a project, those who are faced with tyranny at the hands of neighbouring armies have to defend themselves with their lives and those that have the opportunity of giving Islam to the world should do so..<br /><br />This is an important booklet for three reasons: firstly, it deals with an important issue - that of jihad. Secondly, it is important because it has been written by one of the most prominent Mujahideen of this century - Imam Hasan al-Banna, and thirdly it is important because it deals with an issue that the ummah seems to have misunderstood or forgotten.<br /><br />Imam Hasan al-Banna is the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and one of the pioneers of today’s Islamic revival. It is a shame that so many people are unaware of this man and his contribution towards what we see today. It is the right of the contemporary Muslim generation that they should have access to the writings of this great reformer; especially on this important topic.<br /><br />The Imam, may Allah bless him, shows us that ultimately, and insha’Allah (God-willing) time will be a witness to this, only Islam can save mankind from itself. And jihad on the individual and international scale will be a necessary part of this process of change.<br /><br />The Imam himself was assassinated in 1949, aged 43 years. It is a testimony to his character that Allah answered his duaa’ that he made at the end of this work. May Allah accept our efforts and may Allah similarly accept and answer our duaa’.<br /><br /> <br /><br />Dr A. M. A. Fahmy<br /><br />International Islamic Forum<br /><br />In the Name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate<br /><br />All praise is for Allah, the Lord of the Universe. May Allah bestow peace and blessings upon our Leader Muhammad, Leader of those who strive in Allah's way and Imam of the pious. May He also bestow peace and blessings upon his family and his companions, and all those who strive for the Sharee’ah until the Day of Judgement.<br /><br />All Muslims Must Make Jihad<br /><br />Jihad is an obligation from Allah on every Muslim and cannot be ignored nor evaded. Allah has ascribed great importance to jihad and has made the reward of the martyrs and the fighters in His way a splendid one. Only those who have acted similarly and who have modelled themselves upon the martyrs in their performance of jihad can join them in this reward. Furthermore, Allah has specifically honoured the Mujahideen with certain exceptional qualities, both spiritual and practical, to benefit them in this world and the next. Their pure blood is a symbol of victory in this world and the mark of success and felicity in the world to come.<br /><br />Those who can only find excuses, however, have been warned of extremely dreadful punishments and Allah has described them with the most unfortunate of names. He has reprimanded them for their cowardice and lack of spirit, and castigated them for their weakness and truancy. In this world, they will be surrounded by dishonour and in the next they will be surrounded by the fire from which they shall not escape though they may possess much wealth. The weaknesses of abstention and evasion of jihad are regarded by Allah as one of the major sins, and one of the seven sins that guarantee failure.<br /><br />Islam is concerned with the question of jihad and the drafting and the mobilisation of the entire Umma into one body to defend the right cause with all its strength than any other ancient or modern system of living, whether religious or civil. The verses of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of Muhammad (PBUH) are overflowing with all these noble ideals and they summon people in general (with the most eloquent expression and the clearest exposition) to jihad, to warfare, to the armed forces, and all means of land and sea fighting.<br /><br />We shall not go into exhaustive detail but rather will offer you some Qur'anic verses and Ahaadeeth below as examples since we only wish to show a glimpse of the Islamic message on jihad. Furthermore, we will not delve into the explanation of the Qur'anic verses or Ahaadeeth. You will recognise by the purity of language, the clarity of exposition, the lucidity of ideas and the force of spirituality that explanations and clarifications are not required.<br /><br />The Qur’an on Jihad<br /><br />‘Jihad is ordained for you (Muslims) though you dislike it, and it may be that you dislike something which is good for you and that you like something which is bad for you. Allah knows but you do not know.’<br /><br />(Surat-al-Baqarah (2), ayah 216)<br /><br />‘O you who believe! Be not like those who disbelieve (hypocrites) and who say to their brethren when they travel through the earth or go out to fight: 'If they had stayed with us, they would not have died or been killed,' so that Allah may make it a cause of regret in their hearts. It is Allah that gives life and causes death. And Allah is All-Seer of what you do. And if you are killed or die in the Way of Allah, forgiveness and mercy from Allah are far better than all that they amass (of worldly wealth etc.). And whether you die, or are killed, verily, unto Allah you shall be gathered.’<br /><br />(Surat-aal-Imran (3), ayah 156-158)<br /><br />Notice how "forgiveness" and "mercy" are associated with slaying and death in Allah's way in the first verse, and how the second verse is does not refer to this because it is devoid of the idea of jihad. In this verse, there is an indication of the fact that cowardice is one of the characteristics of unbelievers, but not of believers. And notice how today the unbelievers seem to be brave and the believers seem to be the cowards.<br /><br />‘Think not of those who are killed in the Way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are alive, with their Lord, and they have provision. They rejoice in what Allah has bestowed upon them of His Bounty, rejoicing for the sake of those who have not yet joined them, but are left behind (not yet martyred) that on them no fear shall come, nor shall they grieve.’<br /><br />(Surat-aal-Imran (3), ayah 169-170). Refer up to verse 175 for further information.<br /><br />‘Let those (believers) who sell the life of this world for the Hereafter fight in the cause of Allah., and whosoever fights in the Cause of Allah, and is killed or is victorious, We shall bestow on him a great reward.’<br /><br />(Surat-an-Nisaa’ (4), ayah 74)<br /><br />Refer to the verses (4: 71-78) in the Noble Book to understand how Allah urges the Muslims to remain alert and to acquire experience in warfare, in armies and troops, or as individuals, as circumstances may dictate. Allah also reprimands those who are slack, cowards or opportunists, and He arouses our zeal to protect the weak and prevent oppression. Notice how Allah associates warfare with prayer and fasting, establishing it as one of the pillars of Islam. And how He refutes the false arguments of the waverers, and encourages those who are scared to the utmost degree to plunge into battle and to face death unflinchingly and bravely, showing them that they will welcome death, and that if they die in jihad, they will receive the most magnificent recompense for their lives, and that they will not lose any of their contribution or sacrifice however small.<br /><br />Surat-al-Anfaal is in its entirety an exhortation to jihad and a command to remain steadfast [while engaged] in it, as well as a clear presentation of many of its rules. It is for this reason that the first Muslims (may Allah's grace be upon them) adopted it as a war chant which they would chant whenever their apprehensions mounted and the battle grew grim. Suffice it to quote what Allah (SWT) says:<br /><br />‘Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies of Allah and your enemies.’<br /><br />(Surat-al-Anfaal (8), ayah 60)<br /><br />up to His words (SWT):<br /><br />‘O Prophet! Urge the believers to fight. If there are twenty steadfast amongst you, they will overcome two hundred, and if there are be a hundred steadfast they will overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they (they disbelievers) are people who do not understand’<br /><br />(Surat-al-Anfaal (8), ayah 65)<br /><br />Surat-at-Tawbah too is in its entirety an exhortation to combat and a clear presentation of its rules. It is sufficient to quote what Allah (SWT) says concerning warfare against the treacherous polytheists:<br /><br />‘Fight against them so that Allah will punish them by your hands and disgrace them and give you victory over them and return calmness in the hearts of the believing people thus relieving their anxiety. Allah accepts the repentance of whom He wills. Allah is All-Knowing, All-Wise.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 14-15)<br /><br />And His words (SWT) concerning fighting with People of the Book:<br /><br />‘Fight against those who believe not in Allah nor in the Last Day, nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger and those who acknowledge not the Religion of Truth (i.e. Islam), from among the People of the Book, until they pay the jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 29)<br /><br />The proclamations of the general call in the following verses, end with His words (SWT):<br /><br />‘March forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive hard with your wealth and your lives in the Cause of Allah! This is better for you, if you but knew.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 41)<br /><br />Allah then rebukes those who are cowardly for their attitude and their continuous attempts to escape from jihad, in His words (SWT):<br /><br />‘Those who stayed away (from Tabuk expedition) rejoiced in their staying behind the Messenger of Allah; they hated to strive and fight with their wealth and their lives in the Cause of Allah, and they said, 'March not forth in the heat.' Say: 'The fire of Hell is more intense in heat,' if only they could understand!' So let them laugh a little (and they will) cry much as a recompense of what they used to earn (by committing sins). If Allah brings you back to a party of them, and they ask your permission to go out (to fight), say: 'Never shall you go out with me, nor fight an enemy with me: you agreed to sit inactive on the first occasion: then you sit (now) with those who lag behind.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 81-83)<br /><br />Then Allah praises those who engage in jihad by declaring jihad as Prophet Muhammad's mission and the way of his Companions, as He, the Almighty, says:<br /><br />‘But the Messenger, and those who believed with him, strove hard and fought with their wealth and their lives (in Allah's cause). The good things are for these people, and it is they who will be successful. For them Allah has got ready the Gardens (Paradise) under which rivers flow, to dwell therein forever. That is the supreme success.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 88-89)<br /><br />Then follows an oath of allegiance, comprehensive and protective leaving no excuses, in His words (SWT):<br /><br />‘Verily, Allah has purchased of the believers their lives and their wealth; for the price that theirs shall be the Paradise. They fight in Allah's Cause, so they kill (others) and are killed. It is a promise in truth which is binding on Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur'an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? Then rejoice in the bargain which you have concluded. That is the supreme success.’<br /><br />(Surat-at-Tawbah (9), ayah 111)<br /><br />Surat-al-Qital (commonly known as Surat Muhammad) mentions two key factors that form the foundation of the military spirit: obedience and discipline. Allah has summarised these two factors in the following two verses in His Book. Obedience appears in this Surah where He, the Almighty, says:<br /><br />‘Those who believe say: "Why is a Surah not sent down (for us)?" But when a decisive Surah (explaining and ordering things) is sent down, and fighting is mentioned (i.e. ordained) therein, you will see those in whose hearts is a disease (of hypocrisy) looking at you with a look of one fainting to death. But it was better for them (hypocrites, to listen to Allah and obey Him). Obedience (to Allah) and good words (were better for them). And when the matter (preparation for Jihad) is resolved on, then if they had been true to Allah, it would have been better for them.’<br /><br />(Surat-Muhammad (47), ayah 20-21)<br /><br />As for discipline, it appears in Surat-as-Saff, where He, the Almighty, says:<br /><br />‘Verily, Allah loves those who fight in His Cause in rows (ranks), as if they were a solid structure.’<br /><br />(Surat-as-Saff (61), ayah 4)<br /><br />Surat-al-Fath is also dedicated in its entirety to one of the military campaigns of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), and was a special occasion of jihad, which took place under the shadow of a tree where an oath of allegiance unto steadfastness and death was taken, and this bore the fruit of tranquillity and victory. This is what He (SWT), says:<br /><br />‘Indeed, Allah was pleased with the believers when they gave their bay’ah (pledge) to you (O Muhammad) under the Tree, He knew what was in their hearts, and He sent down As-Sakeenah (calmness and tranquillity) upon them; and He rewarded them with a close Victory; And abundant spoils that they will capture. And Allah is Ever All-Mighty, All-Wise.’<br /><br />(Surat-al-Fath (48), ayah 18-19)<br /><br />These, brother, are some examples of the Qur’anic references on jihad. Its virtues are made clear, and those who do jihad are given the good news of the magnificent reward that will be waiting for them. The Book of Allah is filled with examples like these, and anyone who reads the Qur’an and pays attention to its meaning will be astounded at the negligence of the Muslims who have failed to take advantage of this reward.<br /><br />The Ahaadeeth on Jihad<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayrah, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: ‘I heard the Prophet (PBUH) say:<br /><br />‘By the One in whose Hands is my soul, had it not been for the limitation of resources which caused some of the companions to remain behind (much to their displeasure), I would not have prevented any group from striving in Allah’s way. And by the One in whose hand is my Soul, I wish I could be killed in the Way of Allah, then live again so that I may be killed again, then live again so that again I may be killed, then live again so that again I may be killed.’ (Transmitted by Al Bukhari and Muslim)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayrah, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: ‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘By the One in whose Hand is my Soul, no one is wounded in Allah's way, and Allah knows best who is wounded in His way, except that the colour of his wound appears on the day of judgement as the colour of blood and his scent appears as the scent of musk.’<br /><br />On the authority of Anas, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: ‘My paternal uncle Anas bin al Nadir was absent from the battle of Badr, and he said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, I was absent from the first battle in which you fought the polytheists but if Allah provides me with a second opportunity to participate in a battle with the polytheists, then Allah will witness my actions!’ And when the Day of Uhud arrived and the Muslims retreated, he said: ‘O Allah, I ask you to forgive my brothers for their actions and I excuse myself from the actions of the polytheists!’ Then he rushed forward and met Sa'd bin Mu’aadh and said: ‘O Sa’d bin Mu’aadh, by Allah I smell its scent from below Uhud!’. Sa'd said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, I could not do what he did.’ Anas said: ‘We found him with some eighty wounds either from swords, spears or arrows. We found him murdered and mutilated by the polytheists. No one recognised him except his sister, and even she recognised him by his fingers.’ Anas said: ‘We used to think, or suppose, that this verse came down concerning him and people like him: ‘Among the believers are men who have been true to their covenant with Allah..’ up to the end of the verse (Surat al-Ahzaab (33), ayah 23).’. (Transmitted by Al Bukhari)<br /><br />On the authority of Umm Haritha bint Suraaqah; she went to the Prophet (PBUH), and said: ‘O Prophet of Allah, can you tell me about Haritha (a stray arrow had struck him before the day of Badrý)? For if he is in Paradise, I will bear his loss patiently. But if he is not there, I shall weep for him’. He said:<br /><br />‘O mother of Haritha, there are many gardens in Paradise and your son is in Firdaws (the highest level)...’ (reported by Al Bukhari)<br /><br />Brother, see how Paradise made these companions forget their cares and misfortunes, and enabled them to persevere even through adversities.<br /><br />On the authority of 'Abdullah bin Abi Awfa, may Allah be pleased with him,: ‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘Let it be known that Paradise lies in the shadows of the swords.’ (reported by the Al Bukhari, Muslim and Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Zayd bin Khalid al Juhani, may Allah be pleased with him: ‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who provides for a mujahid in the Way of Allah the Almighty, it is as if he himself has made jihad; and he who has supported the family of a mujahid with an act of goodness, it is as if he himself has made jihad.’ (Transmitted by Al Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud and Al-Tirmidhi) (that is to say he obtains the reward for it)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: ‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who out of faith in Allah and a firm belief in His promise prepares a horse while waiting for jihad then its feeding and drinking and its dung are all in his favour on the day of Resurrection.’ (Transmitted by Al Bukhari)<br /><br />This is, of course, true for all types of wealth (like the horse) given in the way of Allah:<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, it was said:<br /><br />‘O Messenger of Allah, what is equal in reward to jihad in Allah's Way.’ He said: ‘You cannot do it.’ But they brought up the same thing before him two or three times more, and he said: ‘You cannot do it.’ Then he said: ‘The equal of the mujahid in Allah's way is he who fasts and stands in worship throughout the night reciting Allah's verses without becoming tired until the mujahid in Allah's way returns.’ (Transmitted by Al Bukhari, Muslim, An-Nisaa’i , Ibn Majah, and At Tirmidhi)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Sa’eed al Khudari, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘Shall I tell you who is the best of men and who is the worst? Among the best of men is he who is active in Allah's way on the back of his horse or camel, or on foot, until death comes to him. And among the worst of men is he who reads the Book of Allah Almighty, and remains unenlightened (he does not check himself, nor does he admonish and reprove himself).’ (Transmitted by An-Nisaa'i)<br /><br />On the authority of Ibn Abbas, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "I heard the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) say:<br /><br />‘There are two eyes which the Fire shall not touch: the eye which wept for fear of Allah, and the eye which passed the night on guard in the way of Allah Almighty.’ (From At Tirmidhi)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu ‘Umayra, May Allah be pleased with him who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘It is dearer to me that I die in the Way of Allah than that if the entire wealth of the world were to become mine.’ (Transmitted by An Nisaa’i)<br /><br />On the authority of Rashid ibn Sa’d, May Allah be pleased with him, on the authority of one of the companions, that a man said:<br /><br />‘O Messenger of Allah, how is it that the believers will be put to the test in their graves, but the martyr is free?’ The Messenger said: ‘The glittering of swords over his head is a sufficient test for him!’ (Transmitted by An Nisaa’i)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, May Allah be pleased with him: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘The martyr feels nothing more from the pain of slaughter than any one of you feels from the sting of a gnat.’ (Transmitted by At Tirmidhi, An Nisaa’i and Al Darmi. At Tirmidhi designates this as Hasan Gharib)<br /><br />On the authority of Ibn Mas’ud, May Allah be pleased with him, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘Our Lord (SWT) is pleased with a man campaigning in Allah 's way, who, when his companions are driven back, and knowing that the odds are against him, nevertheless returns to the battlefield until he is killed. Then Allah says to the angels: "See how My servant returned to the battle field out of his desire for the reward that I provide and out of his fear from my punishments until he was killed. I call on you to witness that I have forgiven him.’<br /><br />On the authority of ‘Abd al Khayr bin Thabit, on the authority of his father, on the authority of his grandfather, who said: "A woman came to the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) named Umm Khalid, wearing a veil, in order to ask him about a son of hers who had been slain in the way of Allah Almighty....The Prophet of Allah (PBUH) said to her:<br /><br />‘Your son has the reward of two martyrs.’ She asked: ‘Why?" He said: ‘Because he was killed by People of the Book.’ (Transmitted by Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Sahl bin Hunayf (May Allah be pleased with him): "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who asks Allah Almighty for martyrdom with sincerity, will be brought by Allah to the mansions of the martyrs, though he may die on his bed.’ (transmitted by Muslim, An Nisaa’i, Ibn Majah, and At Tirmidhi, Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Khuraym ibn Fatik, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who spends a sum in the way of Allah Almighty will have it accredited to his account seven hundred fold.’ (Transmitted by At-Tirmidhi, who classed it as hasan and also by An Nisaa’i).<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "One of the Companions of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) passed by a ravine in which there was a small fount of fresh water. He was greatly pleased by this, and said to himself: ‘What if I were to withdraw from mankind and live in this ravine?’ He mentioned this to the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), who said:<br /><br />‘Don't do it! When one of you takes his place in Allah's way, it is more excellent than if he prayed in his house for seventy years. Do you not wish for Allah to forgive you and bring you into Paradise? Campaign in Allah's way: he who fights in Allah's way mounted on a camel must necessarily enter Paradise.’ (Transmitted by At Tirmidhi.)<br /><br />On the authority of Al-Miqdam ibn Ma’ad ibn Yakrib, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘The martyr possesses six distinctions with respect to Allah: he is forgiven, amongst the first to be forgiven; he is shown his place in Paradise; he is not punished in the Grave; he is secure from the supreme terror of the day of judgement; the crown of dignity is placed on his head, a single ruby of which is more precious than the entire world and all it contains; he is wedded to seventy-two of the women of heaven; and he may intercede for seventy of his relatives.’ (Transmitted by At-Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayrah, may Allah Almighty be pleased with him, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who meets Allah with no trace of jihad on him will meet Allah with a flaw in him.’ (Transmitted by Al-Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah)<br /><br />On the authority of Anas, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘He who seeks martyrdom sincerely will be granted it, though it may never touch him.’ (Transmitted by Muslim)<br /><br />On the authority of Uthman ibn Affan, may Allah be pleased with him, on the authority of the Prophet (PBUH), who said:<br /><br />‘He who keeps guard for one night in the way of Allah (SWT) will be credited with a thousand nights of fasting and standing in prayer.’ (Transmitted by Ibn Majah)<br /><br />On the authority of Abul-Dardaa’, may Allah be pleased with him, "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘A campaign by sea is the equivalent of ten campaigns by land: he who is tossed about at sea is like one who wallows in his blood in the way of Allah (SWT).’ (Transmitted by Ibn Majah)<br /><br />This tradition honours the sea campaign, and the ummah must proceed from this to protect its coastline and strengthen its fleet. This applies by analogy to the air as well, and Allah will increase the reward of those who campaign by air in His way many times over.<br /><br />On the authority of Jabir ibn Abdullah, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "When Abd Allah bin ‘Amr bin Haram was slain on the Day of Uhud, the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘O Jabir, shall I tell you what Allah (SWT) said to your father? I said: ‘Yes indeed!’ He said: ‘Allah speaks to no-one save from behind a veil, but He spoke to your father face-to-face, saying: "O My servant, ask of Me what thou wilt, and it shall be granted." He said: "O Lord, grant me life, that I may be slain for Thee for a second time!" He said: "But I have already decreed that they shall not return unto it." He said: "O Lord, let them know who are [left] behind me." So Allah (SWT) sent down these verses "Think not of those who are killed in the way of Allah as dead..." (Surat-aal-Imran (3), ayah 169) And so on up to the end of the verse. (Transmitted by Ibn Majah)<br /><br />On the authority of Anas, on the authority of his father (may Allah be pleased with them), on the authority of the Prophet (PBUH), who said:<br /><br />‘It is more pleasing to me to accompany a fighter in Allah's way and to help him on his journey, departing or returning, than this world and what it contains.’ (Transmitted by Ibn Majah)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘Allah's guests are three: the mujahid, the haji, and the one who intends to perform umra.’ (Transmitted by Muslim)<br /><br />On the authority of Abul-Dardaa’, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘The martyr will intercede on behalf of seventy of his family.’ (Transmitted by Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Abdullah ibn ‘Umar, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘When you deal in hidden Riba, and are fully occupied in your own life and give up jihad; Then Allah shall cover you with such disgrace, as would not be removed, until you would return to your religion again.’ (Transmitted by Ahmad and Abu Dawud, and attested as to its authenticity by Al-Hakim)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, who said:<br /><br />"The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) and his Companions set out in a hurry so that they reached Badr ahead of the polytheists. The polytheists arrived, and the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: ‘Rise to the Paradise, whose width embraces the heavens and the earth!" Umayr bin al Humam said: ‘Hurrah!’ The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: ‘What impels you to say "Hurrah! hurrah!" He said: ‘Nothing, O Messenger of Allah, except the hope that I may be one of its people.’ He said: ‘You are indeed one of its people.’"<br /><br />He (Abu Hurayrah) said:<br /><br />"And he [Umayr] took out some dates from his quiver and began eating them. Then he said: ‘If I live long enough to eat all my dates, my life will indeed be a long one!’ So he flung away the remaining dates, and fought until he was slain." Transmitted by Muslim.<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Imran, who said:<br /><br />"We were at the city of Rum, and they sent out a mighty regiment of Byzantinian soldiers against us. A like number of Muslims, and even more, came out against them. ‘Uqbah ibn Amir was at the head of the Egyptians, and Fadaala bin Ubayd was the head of the entire force. One of the Muslims rushed and attacked the Byzantinian regiment until he passed through it. The Muslims shouted and said: ‘Glory be to Allah! He has cast himself into annihilation!’ But Abu Ayyub al Ansari rose and said: ‘Men, you interpret this verse in this manner, but it was sent down concerning only us, the band of the Ansar. When Allah made Islam powerful and its defenders grew numerous, some of us said to others in secrecy, but not to the Messenger of Allah (PBUH): "We lost our wealth at the earlier periods, and then later Allah Almighty made Islam powerful and its defenders became many. What if we were to settle down to regain our lost wealth?" So God Almighty sent down an answer, rebutting what we had said, to His Prophet: ‘and make not your own hands contribute to (your) destruction.’ (Surat al-Baqarah (2), ayah 195). The destruction referred to our settling down with our wealth, while working to increase it, and abandoning jihad. And Abu Ayyub continued in God's way until he was buried in the land of Rum." (Transmitted by Tirmidhi)<br /><br />Notice, brother, that Abu Ayyub said this in his old age, he had passed the evening of life and entered into the night of life yet his spirit remained young while his faith yearned for the return of the might and the grandeur of Islam.<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, on the authority of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), that he said:<br /><br />‘He who dies without having gone on campaign, and without having exhorted himself to do so, dies in a state of hypocrisy.’ (Transmitted by Muslim, Abu Dawud, and there are many reportings of the same meaning)<br /><br />There are many precious Ahaadeeth on this subject which contain guidance or commandments regarding jihad. They are so numerous though that even a large book would not suffice to cover them. But otherwise "Al-’Ibrata Feema Warada ‘Anillahi wa Rasulihi fi al Ghazwu wal Jihad wal Hijra" (The Wisdom in What Was Transmitted in the Qur’an and Sunnah about Fighting, Jihad and Hijrah), by Hasan Sidiq Khan, who is specialised in this research, and "Mashari’ alAshwaq ila Masari’ al-’Ashaq wa Matheer al-Gharam ila Dar as-Salam" and what has come in the books of Ahaadeeth, in the sections on jihad, you will see a lot of good.<br /><br />The Scholars on Jihad<br /><br />I have just presented to you some verses from the Qur'an and the Noble Ahadith concerning the importance of jihad. Now I would like to present to you some of the opinions from jurisprudence of the Islamic Schools of Thought including some latter day authorities regarding the rules of jihad and the necessity for preparedness. From this we will come to realise how far the ummah has deviated in its practice of Islam as can be seen from the consensus of its scholars on the question of jihad.<br /><br />The author of the "Majma' al-Anhar fi Sharh Multaqal-Abhar", in describing the rules of jihad according to the Hanafi School, said: "Jihad linguistically means to exert one's utmost effort in word and action; in the Sharee’ah it is the fighting of the unbelievers, and involves all possible efforts that are necessary to dismantle the power of the enemies of Islam including beating them, plundering their wealth, destroying their places of worship and smashing their idols. This means that jihad is to strive to the utmost to ensure the strength of Islam by such means as fighting those who fight you and the dhimmies (if they violate any of the terms of the treaty) and the apostates (who are the worst of unbelievers, for they disbelieved after they have affirmed their belief).<br /><br />It is fard (obligatory) on us to fight with the enemies. The Imam must send a military expedition to the Dar-al-Harb every year at least once or twice, and the people must support him in this. If some of the people fulfil the obligation, the remainder are released from the obligation. If this fard kifayah (communal obligation) cannot be fulfilled by that group, then the responsibility lies with the closest adjacent group, and then the closest after that etc., and if the fard kifayah cannot be fulfilled except by all the people, it then becomes a fard ‘ayn (individual obligation), like prayer on everyone of the people. This obligation is by virtue of what He, the Almighty, said:<br /><br />‘Then fight the polytheists...!’<br /><br />(Surat at-Tawbah (9), ayah 5)<br /><br />and by what the Prophet (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘Jihad is in effect until the Day of Judgement’<br /><br />If the whole body [of believers] abandons it, they are in a state of sin’ (up to where the author of the book says: ‘If the enemy conquers any territory of Islam, or any regions of it, it becomes a fard ‘ayn, and the woman and the slave shall go forth without the permission of husband or master. In the same way, the child shall go forth without the permission of his parents, and the debtor without the permission of his creditor.’<br /><br />And in the Kitab al Bahr:<br /><br />‘Should a Muslim woman be captured in the East, it is incumbent on the people of the West to rescue her unless she is taken to the stronghold cities of the enemies, and it becomes impossible to free her.’<br /><br />The author of the "Bulghat al-Salik li Aqrab al-Masalik fi Madhhab al-Imam Malik" said:<br /><br />‘Jihad in Allah's way for the purpose of exalting Allah Almighty's Word every year is a fard kifayah. If some fulfil it, the remainder are absolved of it. It becomes specifically designated (i.e., it becomes a fard ‘ayn like prayer and fasting), when the Imam announces it and the enemy attacks the population of a specific region, whereupon it becomes obligatory on them and if this in sufficient then it becomes obligatory on those in their vicinity. In this case it becomes obligatory on the females and the slaves even though they may not have the permission of their husbands or their masters. It is also obligatory on the debtor even though the lender may not agree to it. It also becomes fard 'ayn on that individual who vows to engage in jihad. Parents have the right to forbid their child from taking part in it only under conditions of fard kifayah. And if a Muslim is held as a prisoner of war by enemies and he does not have enough money to pay to free himself, then it is obligatory on the others to secure his release, even if this requires all of the Muslims' wealth.’<br /><br />And in Al-Minhaj of Imam Nawawi of the Shafi'i school:<br /><br />‘Jihad during the time of the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was a fard kifayah, though it is also alleged that it was a fard ‘ayn. Since then, there are two conditions relative to the unbelievers:<br /><br />If they remain in their own territories, then jihad is not an obligation on all Muslims. As long as a sufficient number of Muslims undertake it, the remainder are released from this duty.<br /><br />If they invade one of our territories, its population are obliged to repel them with all their force. If fighting is possible then fighting becomes an obligation. Every slave, poor person, son and debtor must prepare for war, even though they may not have permission.."<br /><br />And in Al-Mughni of Ibn Qudama of the Hanbali school, who said:<br /><br />‘Jihad is a fard kifayah. If a group of people engage in it, the remainder are released. It becomes a fard ‘ayn under three conditions:<br /><br />If two armies meet and two lines of soldiers confront one another, those present are forbidden to leave the battlefield, and it becomes a fard ‘ayn on each one to remain at his station.<br /><br />If the unbelievers attack a territory, it is a fard ‘ayn on its population to fight and repel them.<br /><br />If the Imam calls a group of people to arms, then they must join his military forces. And he should at least announce Jihad once every year.’<br /><br />Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal said:<br /><br />‘I know of nothing after the divine commandments more excellent than jihad, and campaigning by sea is more excellent than campaigning on land.’<br /><br />Anas ibn Malik, may Allah be pleased with him! said:<br /><br />‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) was asleep. Then he awoke laughing, and Umm Haram said: "What makes you laugh, O Messenger of Allah?" He said: "People of my ummah embarked on a military campaign in Allah's way, riding on the surface of this sea as kings on their thrones,"<br /><br />and at the end of the Tradition, Umm Haram asked the Prophet (PBUH) to beseech Allah on her behalf that she might be one of them. So he prayed for her, and she lived long enough to ride upon the sea in the Muslim fleet which conquered the island of Cyprus. She died and was buried there, may Allah be pleased with her.<br /><br />And it says in Al-Muhalla of Ibn Hazm:<br /><br />‘Jihad is obligatory on the Muslims, but if the borders of the Muslims can be protected, the enemy can be repelled and fought within his own territory then the remainder of the people are released from it. And if not, then the obligation remains. God Almighty said:<br /><br />‘Go ye forth, (whether equipped) light or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your persons, in the Cause of Allah!’<br /><br />(Surat at-Tawbah (9), ayah 41)<br /><br />It is not permissible to participate in jihad without the permission of the parent. But if Muslim land is invaded, then it is obligatory on those who can help even if their parents do not grant them permission. However, it is not lawful for him to abandon his parents if his parents would suffer in his absence.<br /><br />And Al-Shawkani said in Al-Sayl al-Jarrar:<br /><br />‘The arguments regarding the jihad being a religious obligation, both in the Qur’an and in the Sunnah, are too numerous to be set down here. Nevertheless, it is a fard kifayah as long as some people are fulfilling this fard kifayah then the rest are absolved from the duty. Otherwise, it is an fard ‘ayn incumbent on every adult by law until the duty is fulfilled. Similarly, it is a fard ‘ayn also on those people who are ordered to jihad by the Imam.’<br /><br />The scholarly people are of one opinion on this matter as should be evident and this is irrespective of whether these scholars were Mujtahideen or Muqalideen and it is irrespective of whether these scholars were salaf (early) or khalaf (late). They all agreed unanimously that jihad is a fard kifayah imposed upon the Islamic ummah in order to spread the Da’wah of Islam, and that jihad is a fard ‘ayn if an enemy attacks Muslim lands. Today, my brother, the Muslims as you know are forced to be subservient before others and are ruled by disbelievers. Our lands have been besieged, and our hurruma'at (personal possessions, respect, honour, dignity and privacy) violated. Our enemies are overlooking our affairs, and the rites of our din are under their jurisdiction. Yet still the Muslims fail to fulfil the responsibility of Da’wah that is on their shoulders. Hence in this situation it becomes the duty of each and every Muslim to make jihad. He should prepare himself mentally and physically such that when comes the decision of Allah, he will be ready.<br /><br />I should not finish this discussion without mentioning to you that the Muslims, throughout every period of their history (before the present period of oppression in which their dignity has been lost) have never abandoned jihad nor did they ever become negligent in its performance, not even their religious authorities, mystics, craftsmen, etc. They were all always ready and prepared. For example, Abdullah ibn al Mubarak, a very learned and pious man, was a volunteer in jihad for most of his life, and 'Abdulwahid bin Zayd, a sufi and a devout man, was the same. And in his time, Shaqiq al Balkhi, the shaykh of the sufis encouraged his pupils towards jihad.<br /><br />And Al Badr al Ayni, the commentator on Al Bukhari (scholar and muhaddith), would take part in jihad one year, study for one year and go on pilgrimage one year, while the judge Asad ibn al Furat of the Maliki School was an admiral in his day and Imam Shafi'i would shoot ten arrows and not miss once.<br /><br />Such was the example set by the early generations of Muslims, may Allah's grace be upon them! My brother, how do we compare with them?<br /><br />Why Do the Muslims Fight?<br /><br />Islam allows jihad and permits war until the following Qur'anic verse is fulfilled:<br /><br />‘We will we show them Our signs in the universe, and in their ownselves, until it becomes manifest to them that this (the Qur'an) is the truth.’<br /><br />(Surat al-Fussilat (41), ayah 53)<br /><br />People have for some time now ridiculed this but today these same people acknowledge that preparation for war is the surest way to peace! Allah did not ordain jihad for the Muslims so that it may be used as a tool of oppression or tyranny or so that it may be used by some to further their personal gains. Rather jihad is used to safeguard the mission of spreading Islam. This would guarantee peace and the means of implementing the Supreme Message. This is a responsibility which the Muslims bear, this Message guiding mankind to truth and justice. For Islam, even as it ordains jihad, it extols peace: the Blessed and Almighty said:<br /><br />‘But if they incline to peace, you also incline to it, and (put your) trust in Allah.’<br /><br />(Surat al-Anfal (8), ayah 61)<br /><br />The Muslims in war had only one concern and this was to make the name of Allah Supreme, there was no room at all for any other objective. The wish for glory and reputation were forbidden to the Muslims. The love of wealth, the misappropriation of the benefits of war and striving to conquer through unjust methods are all made forbidden to the Muslim. Only one intention was possible and that was the offering of sacrifice and the taking of pains for the guidance of mankind.<br /><br />On the authority of Al-Harith bin Muslim, on the authority of his father, who said:<br /><br />‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) sent us on a military expedition. When we reached the area to be raided, I urged on my horse and got ahead of my companions. The people of that area met me with cries of lamentation, and I said to them: "If you say: ‘There is no god but Allah’ you are safe." So they said it. My companions reproached me and said: "You have prevented us from taking any spoils!" When we came back to the Messenger of Allah (PBUH), they told him what I had done. He called me over and found what I had done praiseworthy. Then he said to me: "Allah Almighty has indeed decreed for you so much and so much reward for every human being." And he said: "I myself shall write something for you in the way of a bequest after my death." He did so, sealed it, and handed it over to me.’ (Transmitted by Abu Dawud.)<br /><br />And on the authority of Shaddad bin al Hadi (may Allah be pleased with him):<br /><br />‘A man of the [nomad] Arabs came and believed in the Prophet (PBUH). Then he said: "I shall emigrate with you." And the Prophet (PBUH) put him into the charge of some of his Companions. In a campaign the Prophet (PBUH) took some booty and this was divided up, and he gave him his share. And he [i.e., the Arab] said: "What is this?" He said: "I have apportioned it to you." He said: "It was not for this that I followed you; rather I followed you that I might be pierced here (and he motioned with his hand to his neck) with an arrow, and that I might die and enter Paradise." He said: "If you are truthful in what you have just said, then Allah will fulfil your desire." So they remained there for a space; then they rose to do battle with the enemy. He was carried over to the Prophet, having been struck with an arrow exactly where he had pointed. The Prophet (PBUH) said: "Is it he?" They said: "Yes." He said: "He was truthful in what he said, so Allah answered him." Then he was shrouded in the garment of the Prophet (PBUH), and he [i.e., the Prophet] walked before him and prayed over him. This is part of what he said in his prayer: "O Allah, this is your servant who went forth as an Emigrant in your way and was slain a martyr. And I am a witness unto it." (Transmitted by An-Nisaa'i)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him:<br /><br />‘A man said: "O Apostle of Allah, what of a man who wants to engage in jihad in Allah's way, but desires the goods of this world?" He said: "There is no reward for him." And he [i.e., the man] repeated this question to him three times, but he said: "There is no reward for him."’ (Transmitted by Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari, may Allah be pleased with him, who said:<br /><br />‘The Apostle of Allah (PBUH) was asked about a man who fights courageously, one who fights zealously, and one who fights hypocritically. Which of these was in the way of Allah? He said: "He who fights so that Allah's Word is the most exalted is in Allah's way."’ (Transmitted in Muslim, Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, An-Nisaa'i and Ibn Majah)<br /><br />The companions’ (may Allah's grace be with them) behaviour in the battles and in the territories they conquered indicates the extent to which they abstained from indulging in their personal desires and cravings, and the extent of their dedication to their fundamental and original goal: the guidance of mankind to the truth until Allah's Word is the most exalted. The charge of some people who accuse the companions of being covetous of power and authority, desirous of grabbing countries and ascendancy or that a passion for earning a living was driving their activities is ludicrous.<br /><br />Mercy in the Islamic Jihad<br /><br />The Islamic jihad is the noblest of endeavours and its method of realisation is the most sublime and exalted. For Allah has forbidden aggression. He, the Almighty, has said:<br /><br />‘But transgress not the limits. Truly, Allah likes not the transgressors.’<br /><br />(Surat al-Baqarah (2), ayah 190)<br /><br />and He commanded that justice be observed, even towards the enemy and the adversary. He, the Almighty, has said:<br /><br />‘And let not the enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just: that is nearer to piety.’<br /><br />(Surat al-Maa’idah (5), ayah 8)<br /><br />Allah instructs the Muslims to act with the utmost mercy. For when they fight, they do not instigate hostilities, nor do they steal nor plunder property, nor do they violate someone's honour, nor do they indulge in wanton destruction. In their warfare they are the best of fighters, just as in peace they are the most excellent of peacemakers.<br /><br />On the authority of Burayda, may Allah be pleased with him, who said:<br /><br />‘Whenever the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) appointed a commander over an army or a band of raiders, he told him to remain conscious of Allah Almighty in his inward self and to remain concerned for the care of the Muslims who were with him. Then he [i.e., the Prophet] said: "Strive in the name of Allah in Allah's way! Fight those who disbelieve in Allah: campaign, but do not indulge in excesses, do not act treacherously, do not mutilate, and do not slay children."’ (Transmitted by Muslim.)<br /><br />On the authority of Abu Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, who said:<br /><br />‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said: "When one of you fights, let him avoid [striking] the face."’ (Transmitted by Bukhari and Muslim)<br /><br />On the authority of Ibn Mas’ud, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: "The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) said:<br /><br />‘The most self-restrained from amongst mankind even at the time of killing are the people of iman.’ (Transmitted by Abu Dawud)<br /><br />On the authority of Abdullah bin Yazid al Ansari, may Allah be pleased with him, who said:<br /><br />‘The Messenger of Allah (PBUH) forbade plundering and mutilation.’ (Transmitted by Al Bukhaari)<br /><br />It is forbidden to slay women, children, and old people, to kill the wounded, or to disturb monks, hermits, and the peaceful who offer no resistance. Contrast this mercy with the murderous warfare of the ‘civilised’ people and their terrible atrocities! Compare their international law alongside this all-embracing, divinely ordained justice!<br /><br />O Allah , bless the Muslims with a correct understanding of the deen, and save the world from these injustices with the enlightenment of Islam!<br /><br />Associated Matters Concerning Jihad<br /><br />Many Muslims today mistakenly believe that fighting the enemy is jihad asghar (a lesser jihad) and that fighting one's ego is jihad akbar (a greater jihad). The following narration [athar] is quoted as proof: "We have returned from the lesser jihad to embark on the greater jihad." They said: "What is the greater jihad?" He said: "The jihad of the heart, or the jihad against one's ego."<br /><br />This narration is used by some to lessen the importance of fighting, to discourage any preparation for combat, and to deter any offering of jihad in Allah's way. This narration is not a saheeh (sound) tradition: The prominent muhaddith Al Hafiz ibn Hajar al-Asqalani said in the Tasdid al-Qaws:<br /><br />‘It is well known and often repeated, and was a saying of Ibrahim ibn 'Abla.’<br /><br />Al Hafiz Al Iraqi said in the Takhrij Ahadith al-Ahya’:<br /><br />‘Al Bayhaqi transmitted it with a weak chain of narrators on the authority of Jabir, and Al Khatib transmitted it in his history on the authority of Jabir.’<br /><br />Nevertheless, even if it were a sound tradition, it would never warrant abandoning jihad or preparing for it in order to rescue the territories of the Muslims and repel the attacks of the disbelievers. Let it be known that this narration simply emphasises the importance of struggling against one's ego so that Allah will be the sole purpose of everyone of our actions.<br /><br />Other associated matters concerning jihad include commanding the good and forbidding the evil. It is said in the Hadeeth: "One of the greatest forms of jihad is to utter a word of truth in the presence of a tyrannical ruler." But nothing compares to the honour of shahadah kubra (the supreme martyrdom) or the reward that is waiting for the Mujahideen.<br /><br />Epilogue<br /><br />My brothers! The ummah that knows how to die a noble and honourable death is granted an exalted life in this world and eternal felicity in the next. Degradation and dishonour are the results of the love of this world and the fear of death. Therefore prepare for jihad and be the lovers of death. Life itself shall come searching after you.<br /><br />My brother, you should know that one day you will face death and this ominous event can only occur once. If you suffer on this occasion in the way of Allah, it will be to your benefit in this world and your reward in the next. And remember brother that nothing can happen without the Will of Allah: ponder well what Allah, the Blessed, the Almighty, has said:<br /><br />‘Then after the distress, He sent down security for you. Slumber overtook a party of you, while another party was thinking about themselves (as to how to save themselves, ignoring the others and the Prophet) and thought wrongly of Allah - the thought of ignorance. They said, "Have we any part in the affair?" Say you (O Muhammad): "Indeed the affair belongs wholly to Allah." They hide within themselves what they dare not reveal to you, saying: "If we had anything to do with the affair, none of us would have been killed here." Say: "Even if you had remained in your homes, those for whom death was decreed would certainly have gone forth to the place of their death: but that Allah might test what is in your hearts; and to purify that which was in your hearts (sins), and Allah is All-Knower of what is in (your) hearts."’<br /><br />(Surat al-Imran (3), ayah 154)<br /><br />You should yearn for an honourable death and you will gain perfect happiness. May Allah grant myself and yours the honour of martyrdom in His way!<br /><br />IMAM SHAHEED HASAN AL-BANNABenyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-87081197663746199332008-07-10T21:47:00.000-07:002008-07-10T22:01:38.910-07:00A rare look at secretive Brotherhood in AmericaBy Noreen S. Ahmad Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen, Chicago Tribune<br />Muslims divided on Brotherhood<br /><br />A group aiming to create Islamic states worldwide has established roots here, in large part under the guidance of Egypt-born Ahmed Elkadi<br /><br />By Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Sam Roe and Laurie Cohen<br /><br />Tribune staff reporters<br /><br />September 19, 2004<br /><br /><br />Over the last 40 years, small groups of devout Muslim men have gathered in homes in U.S. cities to pray, memorize the Koran and discuss events of the day.<br /><br />But they also addressed their ultimate goal, one so controversial that it is a key reason they have operated in secrecy: to create Muslim states overseas and, they hope, someday in America as well.<br /><br />These men are part of an underground U.S. chapter of the international Muslim Brotherhood, the world's most influential Islamic fundamentalist group and an organization with a violent past in the Middle East. But fearing persecution, they rarely identify themselves as Brotherhood members and have operated largely behind the scenes, unbeknown even to many Muslims.<br /><br />Still, the U.S. Brotherhood has had a significant and ongoing impact on Islam in America, helping establish mosques, Islamic schools, summer youth camps and prominent Muslim organizations. It is a major factor, Islamic scholars say, in why many Muslim institutions in the nation have become more conservative in recent decades.<br /><br />Leading the U.S. Brotherhood during much of this period was Ahmed Elkadi, an Egyptian-born surgeon and a former personal physician to Saudi Arabia's King Faisal. He headed the group from 1984 to 1994 but abruptly lost his leadership position. Now he is discussing his life and the U.S. Brotherhood for the first time.<br /><br />His story, combined with details from documents and interviews, offers an unprecedented look at the Brotherhood in America: how the group recruited members, how it cloaked itself in secrecy and how it alienated many moderate Muslims.<br /><br />Indeed, because of its hard-line beliefs, the U.S. Brotherhood has been an increasingly divisive force within Islam in America, fueling the often bitter struggle between moderate and conservative Muslims.<br /><br />Many Muslims believe that the Brotherhood is a noble international movement that supports the true teachings of Islam and unwaveringly defends Muslims who have come under attack around the world, from Chechens to Palestinians to Iraqis. But others view it as an extreme organization that breeds intolerance and militancy.<br /><br />"They have this idea that Muslims come first, not that humans come first," says Mustafa Saied, 32, a Floridian who left the U.S. Brotherhood in 1998.<br /><br />While separation of church and state is a bedrock principle of American democracy, the international Brotherhood preaches that religion and politics cannot be separated and that governments eventually should be Islamic. The group also champions martyrdom and jihad, or holy war, as a means of self-defense and has provided the philosophical underpinnings for Muslim militants worldwide.<br /><br />Many moderate Muslims in America are uncomfortable with the views preached at mosques influenced by the Brotherhood, scholars say. Those experts point to a 2001 study sponsored by four Muslim advocacy and religious groups that found that only a third of U.S. Muslims attend mosques.<br /><br />In suburban Bridgeview, Ill., some moderates say they quit attending the Mosque Foundation because the leadership became too conservative and dominated by Brotherhood members.<br /><br />Documents obtained by the Tribune and translated from Arabic show that the U.S. Brotherhood has been careful to obscure its beliefs from outsiders. One document tells leaders to be cautious when screening potential recruits. If the recruit asks whether the leader is a Brotherhood member, the leader should respond, "You may deduce the answer to that with your own intelligence."<br /><br />Islamic state a long-term goal<br /><br />Brotherhood members emphasize that they follow the laws of the nations in which they operate. They stress that they do not believe in overthrowing the U.S. government, but rather that they want as many people as possible to convert to Islam so that one day--perhaps generations from now--a majority of Americans will support a society governed by Islamic law. Muslims make up less than 3 percent of the U.S. population, but estimates of their number vary widely from 2 million to 7 million.<br /><br />Federal authorities say they have scrutinized the U.S. Brotherhood for years. Agents currently are investigating whether people with ties to the group have raised and laundered money to finance terrorism abroad. No terrorism-related charges have been filed.<br /><br />Former leader Elkadi, who has been questioned at length by federal authorities about the inner workings of the Brotherhood, says the group has served Muslims in the United States well. He personally helped establish an Islamic community in the Florida Panhandle, with a mosque, school and health clinic. And though he eventually lost it all--even his medical license--some Muslims still view him as a great Islamic leader.<br /><br />"Islam is for everyone," he says. "It's good for America, good for Muslims too. . . . It's good knowledge, and good knowledge should be available to everyone."<br /><br />Mohammed Mahdi Akef, head of the international Muslim Brotherhood, based in Egypt, lauds Elkadi and the activities of the U.S. Brotherhood.<br /><br />"They have succeeded in saving the younger generations from melting into the American lifestyle without faith," he says. "They have saved their children."<br /><br />Once one of America's most influential Muslims, Elkadi now spends most of his days in front of the TV in his two-bedroom condominium in Sterling, Va., across the Potomac River from Washington.<br /><br />Earlier this year he was diagnosed with a neurological disorder that affects motor skills, speech and memory. He often has difficulty expressing himself and seldom speaks more than two sentences at a time. Sometimes, he says, he smiles for no reason other than to try to remain cheerful.<br /><br />But on many days his memory is clear, and his statements about the major events of the U.S. Brotherhood have been confirmed by others associated with the group.<br /><br />Elkadi, a 64-year-old with a closely trimmed white beard, says he is willing to speak about the Brotherhood because he believes he has nothing to hide. Both he and his wife, Iman, 60, say they have devoted much of their lives to the Brotherhood, and Elkadi says the reason for that is simple: "It's genetic."<br /><br />Both of their fathers were early Brotherhood leaders in Egypt, where the group began in 1928 as an opposition movement to the British-backed Egyptian monarchy. Its founder and leader was schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna, who advocated a return to fundamental Islam as a way to reform Muslim societies and expel Western troops.<br /><br />The Brotherhood slogan became "Allah is our goal; the Messenger is our model; the Koran is our constitution; jihad is our means; and martyrdom in the way of Allah is our aspiration."<br /><br />When Egypt imprisoned and executed some Muslim Brothers in the 1950s, many members fled the country and helped spread the philosophy throughout the Arab world. The group's ideological voice became philosopher Sayyid Qutb, who abhorred Western values and believed the Koran justified violence to overthrow un-Islamic governments.<br /><br />Over time, the Brotherhood gained notoriety for repeatedly attempting to overthrow the Egyptian and Syrian governments and for spawning violent groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian group Hamas.<br /><br />Today the Brotherhood remains based in Egypt, where it officially is banned but is tolerated. The group has renounced violence and now largely organizes political protests, runs professional unions and operates charities, providing social services that the government does not. Brotherhood supporters hold 15 of the 445 seats in the Egyptian parliament.<br /><br />And while Brotherhood activities vary from country to country, and chapters are officially independent, international leaders in Egypt say that all chapters are united in their beliefs and that the Egyptian office gives them advice.<br /><br />In recent months Akef, the international Brotherhood leader, repeatedly has praised Palestinian and Iraqi suicide bombers, called for the destruction of Israel and asserted that the United States has no proof that Al Qaeda was to blame for the Sept. 11 attacks.<br /><br />Iman Elkadi's father, Mahmoud Abu Saud, was particularly involved in the Brotherhood's beginnings in Egypt and remains well-known in the Arab world. An accomplished economist, he is widely regarded as a pioneer in Islamic banking, which requires that interest not be charged for loans.<br /><br />He also was jailed repeatedly for his Brotherhood activities.<br /><br />"My grandfather would tell me that if my dad didn't come home for dinner, he would send someone to check the jails," Iman Elkadi recalls.<br /><br />The Elkadi and Abu Saud families were linked in marriage in 1963 after Ahmed Elkadi, then a 22-year-old preparing to go into the Egyptian military, ran into his future father-in-law at a mutual friend's office. When the young Elkadi learned that Abu Saud had an unmarried daughter, he inquired about her. The father, familiar with the young man's family and its devotion to the Brotherhood, invited him to their home.<br /><br />Soon after, the families arranged for Ahmed and Iman to marry. The wedding was held in Cairo, in a grandparent's garden. Only relatives were invited, though others were keenly interested: Soon afterward, Egyptian intelligence officials called the couple in for questioning.<br /><br />Iman Elkadi says, "They asked my husband, `Couldn't you find anybody else to marry except Mahmoud Abu Saud's daughter?'"<br /><br />A mission in U.S.<br /><br />The Elkadis arrived in the United States in 1967, settling in the small Louisiana city of Monroe, where Ahmed Elkadi continued his medical training at a local hospital. By then the Muslim Brotherhood already was operating in the United States, though secretly.<br /><br />A U.S. chapter of the Brotherhood, documents and interviews show, was formed in the early 1960s after hundreds of young Muslims came to the U.S. to study, particularly at large Midwestern universities, such as Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. Some belonged to the Brotherhood in their homelands and wanted to spread its ideology here.<br /><br />But to protect themselves and their relatives back home from possible persecution, they publicly called themselves the Cultural Society and not the Brotherhood.<br /><br />Many young Muslim professionals joined, including Elkadi. One of his daughters, Mona, recalls that when she was a teen, she often fielded phone calls from women who did not know that their husbands were in the Brotherhood and wondered where they were on a given night.<br /><br />She says the husbands "put the fear of God in me about keeping this a secret. I'd get lectures from some of the men about how I was going to expose them."<br /><br />Not anyone could join the Brotherhood. The group had a carefully detailed strategy on how to find and evaluate potential members, according to a Brotherhood instructional booklet for recruiters.<br /><br />Leaders would scout mosques, Islamic classes and Muslim organizations for those with orthodox religious beliefs consistent with Brotherhood views, the booklet says. The leaders then would invite them to join a small prayer group, or usra, Arabic for "family." The prayer groups were a defining feature of the Brotherhood and one created by al-Banna in Egypt.<br /><br />But leaders initially would not reveal the purpose of the prayer groups, and recruits were asked not to tell anyone about the meetings. If recruits asked about a particular meeting to which they were not invited, they should respond, "Make it a habit not to meddle in that which does not concern you."<br /><br />Leaders were told that during prayer meetings they should focus on fundamentals, including "the primary goal of the Brotherhood: setting up the rule of God upon the Earth."<br /><br />After assessing the recruits' "commitment, loyalty and obedience" to Brotherhood ideals, the leaders would invite suitable candidates to join. New members, according to the booklet, would be told that they now were part of the worldwide Brotherhood and that membership "is not a personal honor but a charge to sacrifice all that one has for the sake of raising the banner of Islam."<br /><br />Mustafa Saied, the Floridian who left the Brotherhood six years ago, recalls how he was recruited in 1994 while a junior at the University of Tennessee. After Saied attended numerous prayer sessions, a fellow Muslim student took him to a quiet corner of a campus cafeteria and asked him to join.<br /><br />"It was a dream, because that's what you're conditioned to do--to really love the Ikhwan," Saied says, using the Arabic term for Brothers or Brotherhood.<br /><br />After he joined, he learned the names of other local members.<br /><br />"I was shocked," he says. "These people had really hid the fact that they were Brotherhood."<br /><br />He says he found out that the U.S. Brotherhood had a plan for achieving Islamic rule in America: It would convert Americans to Islam and elect like-minded Muslims to political office.<br /><br />"They're very smart. Everyone else is gullible," Saied says. "If the Brotherhood puts up somebody for an election, Muslims would vote for him not knowing he was with the Brotherhood."<br /><br />Saied says he left the group after several years because he disliked its anti-American sentiments and its support for violence in the Middle East.<br /><br />"With the extreme element," he says, "you never know when that ticking time bomb will go off."<br /><br />By the 1970s, Elkadi had moved to Missouri and, he says, become treasurer of the U.S. Brotherhood, collecting money from members from across the country. His wife was the unofficial bookkeeper, tracking who was behind on dues.<br /><br />Members were required to pay 3 percent of their income per year, with the money going to travel, books and annual conferences, the Elkadis say. The conferences were held under the Cultural Society name, usually in large hotels and always on Memorial Day weekend. They were invitation-only, with word spread through the prayer groups. Some years, up to 1,000 people attended; every other year, elections were held.<br /><br />While the U.S. Brotherhood was influential from its beginning--in 1963 it helped establish the Muslim Students Association, one of the first national Islamic groups in the U.S.--Elkadi thought the group could expand its reach.<br /><br />And when he was elected president in 1984, he vowed to do just that.<br /><br />Executing his strategy<br /><br />Elkadi had a strategy to make America more Islamic that reflected a long-standing Brotherhood belief: First you change the person, then the family, then the community, then the nation.<br /><br />By 1990, U.S. Brotherhood members had made headway on that plan by helping establish many mosques and Islamic organizations. Some of those efforts were backed financially by the ultraconservative Saudi Arabian government, which shared some of the Brotherhood's fundamentalist goals.<br /><br />Elkadi himself helped create several noted Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Youth of North America, which attempted to draw thousands of high school students to Islam by sponsoring soccer teams, providing scholarships and offering a line of clothing. He served as president of the North American Islamic Trust, a group that helped build and preserve mosques.<br /><br />Some of those organizations eventually would distance themselves from the Brotherhood. The Islamic Society of North America, the umbrella group for the Muslim Youth of North America and the Muslim Students Association, says Brotherhood members helped form those groups but that their overall influence has been limited.<br /><br />Groups that the Brotherhood helped form printed Islamic books, many of which were distributed at mosques and on college campuses. They included Sayyid Qutb's "In the Shade of the Koran" and "Milestones," which urge jihad, martyrdom and the creation of Islamic states. Scholars came to view his writings as manifestos for Islamic militants.<br /><br />"These books had questionable paradigms, especially a dichotomous division between `us' and `them,'" says Umar Faruq Abdallah, a noted Islamic scholar who heads a Muslim educational group in suburban Chicago. "It was very harmful. It helped to create a countercultural attitude in our community."<br /><br />Inamul Haq, professor of religion at Benedictine University in Lisle, Ill., says the U.S. Brotherhood pushed Islam in a conservative direction. "They were in a position to define American Islam. Since they were well-connected in the Middle East, they were able to bring money to build various institutions."<br /><br />Without the Brotherhood, he says, "We would have seen a more American Islamic culture rather than a foreign community living in the United States."<br /><br />In his own community, Elkadi practiced what he preached. After moving to Panama City, Fla., in 1979, he borrowed $2.4 million from a Luxembourg bank managed by his father-in-law, Abu Saud, the early Brotherhood leader, and built a large Islamic medical center just outside of town, real estate records show.<br /><br />Called the Akbar Clinic, the two-story brick building had a surgery center, an emergency room and dental, psychiatry, nutrition and acupuncture services.<br /><br />Inside the clinic, Elkadi set up a small mosque and an Islamic school. The school occupied several rooms on the second floor until the students became too loud and classes had to be moved to a trailer on clinic grounds.<br /><br />In many eyes, Elkadi was a true Muslim leader.<br /><br />"Everyone flocked to him whenever there was a problem," says Aly Shaaban, a Muslim leader in Panama City. "He was a father figure. He had this magnetism. You see his face and you just want to kiss his face."<br /><br />A life's work in ruins<br /><br />But things were beginning to unravel for Elkadi. By 1995 he had lost virtually everything he had worked for: his clinic, the school, his medical license and the presidency of the U.S. Brotherhood.<br /><br />First to go was the clinic. Elkadi had fallen behind on the bills, and by 1988 creditors had won thousands of dollars in judgments against him. To prevent a sheriff's sale, the Islamic bank in Luxembourg took over the property, and eventually it was sold to a drug rehabilitation clinic.<br /><br />But Elkadi faced an even more serious professional problem: Florida regulators started disciplinary action against him for performing unnecessary surgeries at a Panama City hospital and for doing major operations, including a mastectomy, at his clinic without proper precautions, such as an adequate blood supply.<br /><br />Regulators determined that Elkadi had performed unneeded stomach surgery on nine patients. The Florida Board of Medicine concluded that Elkadi "exhibited a total lack of judgment" and was "not a competent physician." The board revoked his license in 1992.<br /><br />At the time, Elkadi adamantly denied the allegations and accused Florida regulators of being "grossly unfair," according to filings with the state.<br /><br />By the mid-1990s, his problems deepened. Not only was he forced to close his now-overcrowded and dilapidated school because of financial difficulties, he learned that Brotherhood leaders wanted him out as president.<br /><br />It remains unclear why he lost his position. Current and former Brotherhood members say they do not know or that Elkadi simply was voted out of office. Elkadi and his wife say he was removed because he was not conservative enough. They say he had been pushing for women and other Islamic groups to be more involved in the Brotherhood, and some members did not like that.<br /><br />"For some members, it's a very ingrown type of mentality," Iman Elkadi says. "You work only among Muslims, don't contact non-Muslims, so that your work is limited to a small circle." She says the Elkadis believed that "the message of Islam is for everybody."<br /><br />Elkadi's daughter says he took this and other rejections hard. Elkadi now says he is not angry about his ouster and still loves the organization and its members. "They are good people because they follow Islam," he says.<br /><br />A change of face<br /><br />In recent years, the U.S. Brotherhood operated under the name Muslim American Society, according to documents and interviews. One of the nation's major Islamic groups, it was incorporated in Illinois in 1993 after a contentious debate among Brotherhood members.<br /><br />Some wanted the Brotherhood to remain underground, while others thought a more public face would make the group more influential. Members from across the country drove to regional meeting sites to discuss the issue.<br /><br />Former member Mustafa Saied recalls how he gathered with 40 others at a Days Inn on the Alabama-Tennessee border. Many members, he says, preferred secrecy, particularly in case U.S. authorities cracked down on Hamas supporters, including many Brotherhood members.<br /><br />"They were looking at doomsday scenarios," he says.<br /><br />When the leaders voted, it was decided that Brotherhood members would call themselves the Muslim American Society, or MAS, according to documents and interviews.<br /><br />They agreed not to refer to themselves as the Brotherhood but to be more publicly active. They eventually created a Web site and for the first time invited the public to some conferences, which also were used to raise money. The incorporation papers would list Elkadi--just months away from his ouster--as a director.<br /><br />Elkadi and Mohammed Mahdi Akef, a Brotherhood leader in Egypt and now the international head, had pushed for more openness. In fact, Akef says he helped found MAS by lobbying for the change during trips to the U.S.<br /><br />"We have a religion, message, morals and principals that we want to carry to the people as God ordered us," he says. "So why should we work in secrecy?"<br /><br />But U.S. members would remain guarded about their identity and beliefs.<br /><br />An undated internal memo instructed MAS leaders on how to deal with inquiries about the new organization. If asked, "Are you the Muslim Brothers?" leaders should respond that they are an independent group called the Muslim American Society. "It is a self-explanatory name that does not need further explanation."<br /><br />And if the topic of terrorism were raised, leaders were told to say that they were against terrorism but that jihad was among a Muslim's "divine legal rights" to be used to defend himself and his people and to spread Islam.<br /><br />But MAS leaders say those documents and others obtained by the Tribune are either outdated or do not accurately reflect the views of the group's leaders.<br /><br />MAS describes itself as a "charitable, religious, social, cultural and educational not-for-profit organization." It has headquarters in Alexandria, Va., and 53 chapters nationwide, including one in Bridgeview, across the street from the mosque there.<br /><br />Shaker Elsayed, a top MAS official, says the organization was founded by Brotherhood members but has evolved to include Muslims from various backgrounds and ideologies.<br /><br />"Ikhwan [Brotherhood] members founded MAS, but MAS went way beyond that point of conception," he says.<br /><br />Now, he says, his group has no connection with the Brotherhood and disagrees with the international organization on many issues.<br /><br />But he says that MAS, like the Brotherhood, believes in the teachings of Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna, which are "the closest reflection of how Islam should be in this life."<br /><br />"I understand that some of our members may say, `Yes, we are Ikhwan,'" Elsayed says. But, he says, MAS is not administered from Egypt. He adds, "We are not your typical Ikhwan."<br /><br />MAS says it has about 10,000 members and that any Muslim can join by paying $10 a month in dues.<br /><br />But to be an "active" member--the highest membership class--one must complete five years of Muslim community service and education, which includes studying writings by Brotherhood ideologues al-Banna and Qutb.<br /><br />There are about 1,500 active members, including many women. Elsayed says about 45 percent of those members belong to the Brotherhood.<br /><br />MAS' precise connection to the Brotherhood is a sensitive issue, says Mohamed Habib, a high-ranking Brotherhood official in Cairo.<br /><br />"I don't want to say MAS is an Ikhwan entity," he says. "This causes some security inconveniences for them in a post-Sept. 11 world."<br /><br />Preserving Muslim identity<br /><br />Elsayed says MAS does not believe in creating an Islamic state in America but supports the establishment of Islamic governments in Muslim lands. The group's goal in the United States, he says, "is to serve and develop the Muslim community and help Muslims to be the best citizens they can be of this country." That includes preserving the Muslim identity, particularly among youths.<br /><br />MAS collected $2.8 million in dues and donations in 2003--more than 10 times the amount in 1997, according to Internal Revenue Service filings.<br /><br />Spending often is aimed at schools, teachers and children, the filings show. The group has conducted teacher training programs, issued curriculum guides and established youth centers. It also set up Islamic American University, largely a correspondence school with an office in suburban Detroit, to train teachers and preachers.<br /><br />Until 18 months ago, the university's chairman was Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a prominent cleric in Qatar and a spiritual figure of the Brotherhood who has angered many in the West by praising suicide bombers in Israel and Iraq. The U.S. government has barred him from entering the country since late 1999. He says that action was taken after he praised Palestinian militants.<br /><br />In the Chicago area, MAS has sponsored summer camps for teenagers. Shahzeen Karim, 19, says a camp in Bridgeview inspired her to resume covering her hair in the Islamic tradition.<br /><br />"We were praying five times a day," Karim says. "It was like a proper Islamic environment. It brought me back to Islam."<br /><br />At a summer camp last year in Wisconsin run by the Chicago chapter of MAS, teens received a 2-inch-thick packet of material that included a discussion of the Brotherhood's philosophy and detailed instructions on how to win converts.<br /><br />Part of the Chicago chapter's Web site is devoted to teens. It includes reading materials that say Muslims have a duty to help form Islamic governments worldwide and should be prepared to take up arms to do so.<br /><br />One passage states that "until the nations of the world have functionally Islamic governments, every individual who is careless or lazy in working for Islam is sinful." Another one says that Western secularism and materialism are evil and that Muslims should "pursue this evil force to its own lands" and "invade its Western heartland."<br /><br />In suburban Rosemont, Ill., several thousand people attended MAS' annual conference in 2002 at the village's convention center. One speaker said, "We may all feel emotionally attached to the goal of an Islamic state" in America, but it would have to wait because of the modest Muslim population. "We mustn't cross hurdles we can't jump yet."<br /><br />Federal authorities say they are scrutinizing the Brotherhood but acknowledge that they have been slow to understand the group.<br /><br />In 2002, customs agents stopped Elkadi at Washington Dulles International Airport and questioned him for four hours. They wanted to know who was in the Brotherhood, where it gets its money and how the Elkadis invested their money. A month later, agents came to Elkadi's home with similar questions. He recalls that he answered every one.<br /><br />Elkadi remains highly regarded in some Muslim circles. An article in 2000 in the MAS magazine praised him as a great Muslim in the ranks of al-Banna and Qutb.<br /><br />He and his wife say they hope the Brotherhood succeeds. After all, they say, everyone in the Brotherhood agrees on the main issue.<br /><br />"Everyone's goal is the same--to educate everyone about Islam and to follow the teachings of Islam with the hope of establishing an Islamic state," Iman Elkadi says. "Who knows whether it will happen or not, but we still have to strive for it."<br /><br />- - -<br /><br />Brotherhood has grown in influence<br /><br />The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt more than seven decades ago, is among the most powerful political forces in the Islamic world today.<br /><br />1928: The Muslim Brotherhood is formed in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna to promote a return to fundamental Islamic beliefs and practices and to fight Western colonialism in the Islamic world.<br /><br />Late 1930s: The Brotherhood starts forming affiliated chapters in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria.<br /><br />1948: The Brotherhood is implicated in the assassination of Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Nuqrashi, who had banned the group. Al-Banna denies involvement.<br /><br />1949: The Egyptian government retaliates for Nuqrashi's assassination by killing al-Banna.<br /><br />1954: A Brotherhood member tries to assassinate Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and fails. Nasser executes several of the group's leaders and incarcerates thousands of its followers.<br /><br />1962: The Cultural Society is created as the first Brotherhood organization in the United States. Society members help establish numerous Islamic organizations, mosques and schools.<br /><br />1966: Sayyid Qutb, a Brotherhood ideologue who urged Muslims to take up arms against non-Islamic governments, is executed by Nasser's regime.<br /><br />1982: In Hamah, Syria, at least 10,000 people are killed by government troops suppressing an uprising by the Brotherhood.<br /><br />1993: The Muslim American Society, initially based in Illinois and now in Virginia, is created to be a more public face of the Brotherhood in the U.S.<br /><br />2001: The U.S. names Brotherhood member Youssef Nada and his Swissbased investment network, allegedly established with backing from the Brotherhood, as terrorist financiers. Nada denies any terrorist links.<br /><br />2002: Tens of thousands of Brotherhood supporters fill the streets of Cairo during a funeral for group leader Mustafa Mashhour on Nov. 15.<br /><br />2003: U.S. authorities investigating alleged terrorism funding describe Virginia businessman Soliman Biheiri as the Brotherhood's "financial toehold" in the U.S. Biheiri denies any terrorist links.<br /><br />2004: The Egyptian government rounds up dozens of Brotherhood supporters, freezes members' assets and ousts one of its backers from parliament.<br /><br />Tribune foreign correspondent Evan Osnos, staff reporter Stephen Franklin and Hossam el-Hamalawy contributed to this report.Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-5807409139348111790.post-16007687892227506252008-07-10T21:41:00.000-07:002008-07-11T19:24:08.453-07:00Purpose of the blogThis log is to expose the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] as it is. The Muslim Brotherhood is not a moderate group. It is a radical Islamist group that has the same world view and interpretations of Islam as Al Quada. However, unlike Al Quada, the Muslim Brotherhood, while it uses terrorism when convenient for them, does not only use terrorism. It also uses the political process. The The MB also inspired or was the father of many radical Islamist groups including Al Quada, Islamic Jihad. Hamas is the Palestinian wing of the MB. The MB is actually more dangerous than Al Quada because it as well as sometimes using terrorism, it also seeks to destroy the west from within. The MB's goal, like the goal of the rest of the radical Islamist movement, is to create a totalitarian Fundamentalist Islamic caliphate to dominate the world. The Shiite radical Islamists such as the regime in Iran and Hezobllah seek to have a Fundamentalist Shiite caliphate to dominate the world while Sunni radical Islamists including the Muslim Brotherhood seek to have a Fundamentalist Sunni caliphate dominate the world. Not only will we include articles exposing the Muslim Brotherhood, we'll also show you the MB in their own words. However, the title of their works [if an MB's members work includes a preface by someone who isn't a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, I will also include the preface in the works by MB members] shall also be the title in of their works shown in this blog. I fiercely oppose the MB and the rest of the radical Islamist movement. However, their works are shown mainly to expose this dangerous organization.Benyamin Solomonhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13994707495154383825noreply@blogger.com0